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INTRODUCTION
U. S. airframe manufacturers have dominated the world market
for passenger aircraft since the advent of jet-powered planes in the late
1950's. This dominance, the direct result of superior technology, was
so complete that practically every airline in the non-communist world
flies aircraft manufactured in the United States. A number of benefits
accrued to the U.S. because of the phenomenon:
• U.S. airframe and engine manufacturers, as well as
subcontractors, prospered to an extraordinary
degree during the period of peak demand for their
products, creating innumerable jobs throughout
the U.S. economy.
• The sale of aircraft and parts overseas was a
significant source of foreign exchange for the
U.S. during a period when balance of payment
difficulties were a major national economic
problem. Similarly, U. S. airlines purchased
primarily from domestic rather than foreign sources
and this also llaS an important positive element
in preserving a precarious national economic
position.
U. S. dominance of world markets during the late 50's and
through the decade of the 60's was the result of superior technology.
Foreign manufacturers were unable to provide aircraft that could move
people as cheaply as could U.S. aircraft manufacturers. Foreign aircraft,
principally of British and French origin, were sold on a limited basis
in this country. Many of these foreign built aircraft have since been
replaced by more efficient U.S. built transports.
The conditions that prevailed through this period of U.S.
dominance have radically changed. The free World has experienced
2simultaneous recession and inflation, and operating costs have dramatically
climbed as a result of increased fuel costs. These forces have had a
drastic effect on the economic health of both U.S. manufacturers and
airlines. Equally significant, the technical competence of foreign
manufacturers has increased to the point where it can be considered to
be on par with that of U.S. producers. The overcapacity that currently
exists in some airlines will preclude their purchasing new aircraft for
Some years to come, but eventually rising traffic and retirement of
existing aircraft will create a demand for new transports. This market
may not develop until late in the 1980's, but the producers that will
dominate it will most likely be those that offer advanced technology
at the lowest cost. In light of all projections, fuel economy, translated
into costs per seat mile, will be one of the dominant factors.
Accordingly, it is essential that U.S. manufacturers prepare themselves
so that they might participate in the future sale of civilian transports,
at least on a fair-share basis.
Having recognized that fuel economy would be a pivotal
question influencing the future sale and utilization of commercial
aircraft, the U.S. Senate in early 1975 asked NASA to conduct a study
to establish reasonable goals and a plan for developing improved aircraft
by the mid-1980's. As a result of that study, the NASA Aircraft Energy
Efficiency (AGEE) Office was established.
The AGEE Office has management responsibility for technology
programs intended to improve the fuel efficiency of future civil
transport aircraft and to disseminate this technology in an orderly and
timely fashion. The AGEE Office has developed a progra;n which is
intended to accelerate the readiness of advanced technologies for
energy-efficient aircraft. The program directs the research and
development activities of the NASA aeronautical research centers and
their contractors On advanced technology, which offers significant
advantages from a balanced consideration of performance, fuel efficiency,
reliability, and cost reduction. Specifically, the program is divided
into five technical thrusts. three under airframe technology and two
under engine technology as follows:
3Airframe Technology
• Energy Efficient Transport
• Laminar Flow Control
• Composite Primary Aircraft Structures
Propulsion System Technology
• Engine Component Improvement
• Energy Efficient Engine.
To maximize the benefits from this program, the ACEE program
managers must select the most promising technologies and sUI'port them to
the point at which manufacturers will continue development and incorporate
them into future aircraft and engines.
The decision to launch a program to develop a new aircraft or
engine represents a major financial hazard to even the strongest airframe
and engine manufacturers. In the air transport industry, manufacturers
have risked one, two, and even four times their net worth to launch a
major civil transport aircraft. In contrast, established companies in
other U.S. industries rarely enter into a situation where the failure of
a new product could ruin the organization. They are more diversified,
have a strong capital and financial base, and a large potential pool of
customers. Failure of a new venture rarely can have the same effect ·as
it would in the airframe industry.
When large companies take such extremely high financial risks,
it is desirable to minimize the technical risks involved to provide the
greatest pos~ible chance for financial success. Therefore, it is
important that the launch of a new transport program be undertaken only
when it can be demonstrated that the technologies are well understood and
the technical risks are minimal.
Developing the advanced technology for a civil transport
aircraft is just one part of a successful program. Additional requirements
include the successful blending of new technology with the old, solving
major financing and underwriting difficulties, lining up customers, and
introducing the aircraft at the proper time and cost. This process
begins with the conceptual design of the airframe or engine and ends
with the decision to produce the aircraft.
4The process by which new technology is transferred into an
airframe or engine design is not well understood. Consequently, NASA
funded a three-part study to gain insight into the corporate decision-
making process used to develop and acquire a new or derivative civil
transport. This report encompasses one part of the study. Its objective
is to explore the process by which new technology is introduced into
civil transports by airframe and engine manufacturers. Other contractors
are studying the problem from the point of view of the airlines and from
the market vielvpoint using econometric forecasting. Battelle's study of
the technology development process is based on a review of current
technical literature, interviews with key personnel in maj or airframe
and engine manufacturers, and an analysis of the decision interactions
in the developmen( cycles of both civil transport aircraft and engines.
Before the results of this analysis are described, it is
advisable to briefly review the recent history of engine and airframe
development and of the development process from which these equipments
evolve. Consequently, the body of this report is organized into the
following sections.
• A brief historical description of the development
of the high-bypass-ratio engines and wide-body
transports.
• An overview of the generic development stages
required for engine and airframe development.
• A description of the analysis process used to
identify the people who influence th~ decisions
at various stages of commercial air transport
development, and the barriers, real or imaginary,
that must be overcome in adopting new technology.
• Description of factors that affect the jet
engine and airframe development processes.
• A brief description of future commercial jet
engine and airframe development.
• An overview of Ni,SA' s aircraft energy ef ficiency
program
• Conclusions.
5REVIE\V OF RECENT COHHERCIAL JET ENGINE
AND AIRFRAHE DEVELOPHENT
The past twenty years have seen the evolution of commercial
aircraft from the introduction of the then modern B-707, DC-8, and
Convair 880/990 series of transports powered by axial flow jet engines
to the world-wide operation of wide-bodied B-747, DC-lO, L-lOll, and
A-300 airframes powered by large high-bypass-ratio turbofans. While the
study is primarily concerned with the factors that influence the
development process for such aircraft, the foll",,,ing brief historical
reviews of their evolution helps to place the development process into
context «ith respect to the introduction of specific engines and
airframes.
Recent Engine Developments for
Large Civil Transport Aircraft
High-Bypass-Ratio Engines
In 1961 both Pratt & Whitney Aircraft (P&WA) and
General Electric (GE) embarked on company-funded development programs
for advanced turbine engine cores; F&WA with a lightweight gas generator
and GE with its GEl "building block". As part of that effort, feasibility
studies «ere conducted to establish the design of a new turbofan engine
which would offer major technological advances over the turbofans then
in-service or going into service. Design goals included reduced fuel
consumption, improved noise levels, simpler construction for easy
disassembly, reduced engine length, and growth capabilities to meet future
airline requirements. In order to establish reasonable preliminary
design goals, studies were made of thrust-weight ratio progress, specific
fuel consumption progress, pressure ratio, and turbine inlet temperature
increases that might be technically feasible.
Concurrently, P&WA was also performing preliminary design
studies of its Advanced TecHnology Engine. In 1962, the first layout
6for an advanced technology engine was completed and company funds were
committed for construction of two engines in the following year. On
April 30, 1964 the first experimental engine (the STF200) was run at
(1) *31,000 Ib-thrust, and 2:1 bypass ratio.
Meanwhile, GE was promoting the GEl which could be used in
conj unc tidn with a variety of "add-on lt component arrangements to produce
propulsion systems tailored directly to the needs of individual aircraft
designs. The high-bypass-ratio variant of the GEl series was the GEI/6
which was conceived, designed, built and test-run within an eight month
period in 1964.
The ultimate connection between these various engine
developments was the USAF draft CX-4 requirement which subsequently
became the CX-HLS (Experimental Cargo: Heavy Logistics System) - the
C-5A. Its propulsion requirements were for high take-off thrust and
low cruise SFC, implying a high-bypass-ratio turbofan. The C-5A
competition was to prove highly significant for both P&WA and GE.
In order to satisfy USAF requirements, both P&WA and GE
considered higher bypass ratios than proposed in their respective phase
zero proposals. At this point, a key decision was made by the P&WA
division leader; viz. their C-5A engine proposal would not use an air-
cooled turbine rotor! As a result, P&WA entered its 40,000 lb-thrust,
3.. 4: 1 bypass ratio JTFI4E-a derivative of the STF200. GE, on the other
hand, took the technological gamble and proposed a two-thirds scale of
the GEI/6 (the TF39) which used an air-cooled high pressure turbine
rotor. The increased turbine inlet tem;-'erature, achieved only with turbine
cooling, was sufficient to demonstrate GE's unique 1 1/2 stage 8:1
bypass ratio turbofan.
In August 1965, GE was awarded a $459 million contract to
develop and supply the 41,000 Ib-thrust TF39 for the C-5A; 258 engines
were to be produced. (1) Thus, on the strength of a U.S. gover-nment-funded
program, GE was able to enter the commercial engine market at a decisive
moment in air transport development.
Later in 1965, F&WA purchased the two JTF14E demonstrators
from the USAF and co~tinued with a company-funded test program. (1) The
decisi6n to use these engines in further developing the technology and
* References are given at the end of this report.
7components that would be required for commercial versions of the powerplant
was made by United Aircraft Corporate management. However, it was
P&WA division management that insisted on an air-cooled turbine rotor
for the commercial engine. During the latter months of 1965, P&WA
engineers were meeting with the technical staffs of those airlines that
had expressed an interest in large transport aircraft. The objective of
these discussions was to define the engine performance requirements for
these aircraft. Simultaneous discussions were held with Boeing and
Douglas, the two losing contestants in the C-5A airframe competition.
As a result of these inputs and the STF200 and JTF14E experience, the
JT9D-l was developed with a 5:1 bypass-ratio and provided 41,000 lb-thrust.
Unlike, the JTF14E, the JT9D-l was sized to meet cruise thrust requirements
rather than take-off requirements. The first two rows of turbine vanes
and the first two of turbine blades in the JT9D are air~cooled. For
the first time in a commercial engine, P&WA used variable stators on
the high-pressure compressor. Furthermore, engine complexity was greatly
reduced by eliminating 3 of the 7 engine bearings common to engines than
in-service. The JT9D-l was chosen in 1966 by Pan American to power their
Boeing 747s.
The 747 had initially been based on using JT9D-l engines
rated at 41,000 Ib with growth capacity to 42,000 lb. The JT9D-3 would
eventually become available at 43,500 lb. However, because of airplane
weight problems, delivery schedules, and cash flow problems, the engine
certification schedule had to be compressed. As a result of this
shortened engine development time, the early 747s experienced severe
engine problems.
Meanwhile, GE was apparently intent on offering a virtually
identical version of the military TF39, the CTF39, for the Boeing 747
program. However, the TF39's performance specifications were not suitable
'or commercial application. In reportedly finishing a poor third among
the three engines proposed for the 747, the CTF39 was apparently
severely penalized for the following reasons: excessive noise emission,
and excessive thrust lapse rate. (2) In order to overcome these
8difficulties, GE announced the endorsement and commitment of corporate
funding for the development of the new CF6/34 turbofan in September,
1967. (3)
The CF6-6, a two shaft turbofan derived from the TF39, first
ran on October 31, 1968. Following a series of successful factory and
outdoor tests, the engine was released for production in Febcuary 1969.
The CF6-6 was certified in mid-1970, entering airline service in
August 1971-
versions. An
It is available in 40,000, 41,000, and 43,000 Ib-thrust
uprated derivative of the CF6-6, the CF6-50, is undoubtedly
GE's most important commercial engine. By designing the original series
of turbofans to facilitate introduction of core-engine booster stages
and other component changes, GE was able to step ahead of the competing
P&WA JT9D and Rolls-Royce RB.211 to produce an engine in the 50,000 Ib
bracket. The CF6-50 is now being flown on DC-IO-30s, 747-300s, and
A300s. It entered service as the CF6-50A at a 49,000 Ib-thrust rating.
Growth versions are expected up to 60,000 Ib-thrust by incorporating
a larger fan.
GE estimates that it cost $500 million for them to get back
into the commercial engine business with the CF6--even with the TF39
base. This includes engine development, production and worldwide product
support facilities. Furthermore, GE must pay the U.S. government a
royalty on each CF6 engine sold.
High-bypass-ratio turbofan engines were introduced into
commercial service in January, 1970. The first was P&WA's JT9D on a
Pan American 747 followed by GE's CF6 on an American Airline DC-IO in
August, 1971 and finally Rolls-Royce's RB.211 on an Eastern Airlines
L-IOll in April, 1972. (1) During the past six years, P&WA has been sued
by Boeing over JT9D stiffness problems; the CF6 has suffered cracking
of its C sump and bird ingestion problems, and the disintegration of
fan discs forced Rolls-Royce to modify its disc design and introduce a
new material specification. The cost of developing these high-bypass-ratio
engines has caused financial problems for all three manufacturers, even
forcing Rolls-Royce into r'C~eivership. It is little wonder that the
engine companies were unwilling to undertake the next engine development
program - the ten-ton engine - on a single company basis.
9The Ten-Ton Turbofans
In November, 1971 General Electric and Snecma agreed to jointly
develop a new ten-ton (20,000 lb-thrust class) turbofan engine, the
CFM56. Two and one-half years later, on June 20, 1974, the first engine
was tested. (4) Present plans are to certify the engine at 24,000 lb-thrust
by the end of 1978, but to offer the engine initially at only 22,000 lb-
thrust. Within six years of introduction, the CFM56 should be
available in growth versions up to 27,000 lb-thrust. (5)
Since GE's FlOl military turbofan is providing the core engine
for the CFM56, U'.S. governmental approvals had to be obtained prior to
exporting this technology to France. Furthermore, GE must pay a royalty
to the U.S. government on every CFM56 sold. Even with the FlOl technology
base, total CF1f56 development costs, exclusive of production investment,
are estimated at $500 million. (5) These costs will be shared equally by
GE and Snecma; although, GE's portion is self-funded, whereas Snecma's
support comes from French government loans. GE does not expect to break
even on the program until ten years after introduction.
GE is responsible for the gas generator, the main fuel control,
and system design integration. Snecma will provide the low-pressure
(l-p) system, the reverser system, and engine installation.
The CFN56 has been designed for low specific fuel consumption,
low noise levels, and simple maintenance. Results from NASA research
activities in noise reduction have been used in selecting fan blade
characteristics, such as tip speed, blade spacing, and blade profile.
NASA's clean-combustor program is providing data to be used in satisfying
future emission requirements. GE is paying particular attention to
problem areas that occurred during the introduction of the CF6. Two
specific items are tolerance control and secondary flow seals.
Preliminary design of Pratt & lihitney Aircraft's company-funded
JTlOD-l dates back to October, 1971. At that time, the engine was being
designed to satisfy USAF requirements for the A}fST (Advanced Nedium STOL
Transport). However, P&WA, Goon thought that there would be a much
bigger demand for this size engine in the commercial market. In order
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to insure penetration of European markets and alleviate the development
cost burden, P&WA announced development of the JTlOD-2 in collaboration
with }lTU and Fiat in Hay, 1973. To that point, P&HA had invested
approximately $40 million in the engine and needed an estimated
$200-300 million investment capital to produce the engines. (6) A fourth
partner, Rolls-Royce, is being added to the consortium; although their
participation had to be approved by the U.S. Justice Department, after
considering U.S. anti-trust laws. However, since P&WA did not utilize
military engine technology directly, export of the JTlOD was not
investigated by either the Defense or State Departments to the extent
the CFM56 was. Understandably then, without a previous technology base,
total development costs of the JTIOD could approach $1000 million. (7)
Certification is ~urrently planned for late 1979. P&WA will maintain
overall program control, provide the gas generator, and be responsible
for engine/aircraft integration. R-R will provide the fan, the diffuser,
the combustion system, and the first stage nozzle guide vane. MTU is
designing the I-p turbine while Fiat will provide the accessory gear
box and other external parts.
As the two ten-ton engines continue development, there is
still no firm application, civil or military. Proposals to re-engine
existing 707s and DC-8s with ten-ton turbofans are being rejected by
the airlines because of the estimated $9 million cost per aircraft.
Nevertheless, both GE and P&WA believe that the new engines must be
developed long before specific airframes because of the longer engine
development lead times.
Both GE and P&HA are mainta:i.ning control over the engine core
development in their respective programs. Fan, low-pressure turbine,
casing, and accessories are being developed by their foreign partners.
If engine oorsortia continue to be the rule in the future and U.S.
companies maintain primary control of the engine core, NASA should
concentrate their research efforts on core-related technologies.
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Review of Recent Airframe Developments
for Large Civil Transport Aircraft
Intercontinental Hide Body Transports
Aa discussed in the review of high-bypass-ratio engines, the
USAF in the mid-1960's supported study contracts and held a competition
to build a large military cargo aircraft. These studies and development
programs provided the technical base for the development of the wide-body
civil transports for each of the companies. Boeing was the first to
attempt to capitalize on this knowledge when it formed a Preliminary
Design team in August 1965, even before the military contract had been
awarded, to design a very large intercontinental range, commercial transport.
Subsequently, Lockheed offered commercial versions of the C-5 and Douglas
offered a commercial version of its proposed large military transport to
the airlines. (8)
In the first round of presentations, Boeing offered to the
airlines several versions of a mid-winged, double-decked, double-lobed
fuselage configuration which had gross weights ranging between 532,000 lb
and 599,400 lb. This configuration was rejected by the airlines and by
January 1966, Boeing was showing the B-747 as a low-winged, four-engined
aircraft with a large circular fuselage and having gross weights between
625,000 and 675,000 lb. The aircraft would incorporate the latest
advances in wing aerodynamics a~d high-lift technology. It would also
utilize the JT9D high by-pass engine being developed concurrently by
Pratt & ~~itney. (9) This time the airlines reacted favorably to the
design and in March 1966, the Board of Directors of Boeing gave tentative
approval for the project pending the receipt of orders for 50 aircraft.
The dollar value of this order would be $1 billion Or the estimated cost
of the development of the aircraft. In April 1966, Pan American ordered
25 aircraft for delivery in the fall of
56 orders and the B-747 was an official
1969. By August
. (8)pro] ect.
1966, Boeing had
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Boeing had committed to a $1 billion program using private
venture capital. Part of this investment was the construction of a
completely new production line from the ground up. The B-747 production
facility was built at a cost of $250 million. The decision was made
at the height of the airlines earning po"er and forecasts for future
passenger volume were very promising. The program proceeded, but not
without some problems.
In 1967, during the detailed design stage, it became apparent
that the aircraft would exceed its weight design goal of 680,000 lb and
have to be increased to 710,000 lb. (9) A Task Force was organized to
review the design and offer suggestions to improve the existing design.
This effort was considered to be an internal design competition by the
original design team. After a review of the findings presented by the
Task Force and the original design team, the original design team was
allowed to continue, but with an emphasis on saving weight. They were
able to reduce the weight of the aircraft 1) by careful redesign of major
wing components, 2) by substituting Nomex, a composite material, for
aluminum in the wing-fuselage fairings, 3) by using titanium rather than
steel in some of the major load-carrying members such as the landing gear,
(8)
and 4) by weight-conscious design in secondary structures. In spite
of all these efforts, Boeing had to revise its thrust requirements from
41,000 lb per engine to 43,500 lb. This was a higher thrust engine than
originally planned for by Pratt & Whitney, and eventually led to operational
problems with the engine in the early B&747's because the engines had to
be developed faster than originally anticipated. (9)
By mid-1967, the production facility was complete and assembly
of the first aircraft began. Roll-out of the first aircraft occurred
on September 30, 1968, just two years after the production authorization
was issued. The first test flight occurred on February 9, 1969, and the
aircraft was certified in December 1969. The first commercial flight was
on January 21, 1970. (9)
13
In addition to the successful development of a very large
commercial transport (more than twice the size of previous aircraft) using
only private venture capital, the B-747 program incorporated several
highly innovative manufacturing operations. Tape-driven numerically-
controlled milling machines were used to cut large billets of aluminum
to intricately-designed wing and fuselage parts. The wings were lofted
(the airfoil sections drawn) by computerized methods which permitted
the successful assembly on the production line of components fabricated
by several vendors in various parts of the country. A 5-axis German-made
milling machine speeded up the manufacturing of large complex shapes.
And finally, metal bonding was used to replace conventional riveting and
welding of several components. This process improved the strength to
weight ratio and Leduced the weight of these components and, in some
instances, reduced drag by providing a rivet-free, smooth surface. (8)
Medium Range Hide Body Transports
The immediate Success of the jet transport and the promise of
ever-increasing passenger volume caused the domestic airlines to consider
the need for a medium range wide-body passenger aircraft in the mid-1960's.
This was formalized by American Airlines who issued an RFP in April 1966
for a 220/230 passenger, l850-n.mi,range aircraft. After several iterations
by Lockheed and Douglas, the aircraft evolved into a 250 passenger,
2500 n.mi. range, trijet. In February 1968, American Airlines placed
an order for 30 Douglas DC-lO's equipped with GE CF-6 engines. (10) Based
on market surveys and the anticipated heavy demand for such aircraft,
Lockheed and its engine partner, Rolls-Royce, committed to build its
version, the L-lOll, in March 1968. (11)
The decision by American Airlines to buy the DC-IO was made
mostly on nontechnical reasons. Both aircraft for all practical purposes
were identical. Their physical dimensions, seating capacity, range, cruise
speed, etc., were almost exactly the same. After American made the
initial purchase, other airlines who played a role in the evaluation of the
designs placed their orders: TI,A, Eastern, and Delta purchased the
Lockheed 1011' s and United opted for DC-IO' s. (10)
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These wide-body transports brought a new level of comfort to
the passenger and gave the airlines a potentially highly economic and
highly profitable vehicle for transporting people and cargo. However,
the anticipated passenger volume failed to materialize. Now several airlines
are burdened· with over-capacity and these aircraft have placed economic
burdens on them because of their high acquisition costs.
15
COM}lliRCIAL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
As indicated in the preceding sections, the development of a
commercial transport is a lengthy and expensive process, typically requiring
12-15 years from conception to the first operational flight. The generic
design and development cycles for both engines and airframes are illustrated
in Figure 1. It is, in reality, a 2-step process; the first part being
the development of the propulsion system. This element of the process
requires the full 12-15 years, and at current estimates, can cost more than
$1 billion. The airframe development usually requires 5-7 years, and
commences after the appropriate engine technology is demonstrated. Current
costs, not including engines, for the development of a new transport
are estimated at more than $2 billion, and for derivative aircraft at
$100 and $750 million, depending on the number and magnitude of changes
to be made to the basic aircraft. The development cycles for the engines
and airframes are discussed briefly in the following sections.
The Engine Development Process
The development of modern aircraft engines can be a 15 year
process from initial concept through introduction to service. In order
to structure technological research programs which have a high probability
of implementation, it is necessary to understand the engine development
process, its timing, and key decision points. A thorough understanding
of the process can also aid NASA in determining how far to sponsor
technological programs.
Long range planning requirements for aircraft engines are
based on 20-year market projections within both civil and military sectors.
From these market forecasts, system requirements are defined which
provide the input to preliminary design teams. Their outputs are used
in developing 10-year business plans for the manufacturers.
After marketing and planning studies have defined the
requirements for a new eng~}'e, there are four stages in the design and
development cycle that lead to production. They are
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(1) The Preliminary Design stage during which
engineering studies, based on the marketing
inputs, of possible engine configurations
are made.
(2) The Exploratory Development stage during which
the validity of advanced concepts and new
technologies for components are demonstrated.
(3) The Advanced Development stage during which the
components for a proposed engine are assembled
and tested as a unit to demonstrate system
capability.
(4) The Engineering Development stage during which
entire prototype engine system are used to
demonstrate officially established operational
requirements before production.
These stages are shown in Figure 1 with a typical time scale.
The preliminary design stage is approximately an 18 to 24-month
period during which engines based on different engineering cO'1cepts are
sized to meet projected operational requirements. These operational
requirements are based upon marketing studies that forecast aircraft
requirements 15 to 20 years in the future. At this point, engine
concepts are developed and their components and required new technologies
are identified. Engine tradeoff analyses are performed to yield an
initial definition of engine cycle, airflow size, thrust level, etc.
If the concepts show promise, an exploratory development program is
established to develop the necessary components and associated
manufacturing technologies.
The objectives of exploratory development are to demonstrate
the validity of advanced concepts and new technologies on the component
level. (12) Components for the proposed engines are designed and tested
to demonstrate that the components necessary for the proposed engines
are feasible and can meet performance requirements. Usually there are
several contenders at this point, each method having been identified as
a possibility during the preliminary design phase. Engineering reviews
of these programs are conducted monthly; upper management reviews then
at least annually. This ph~se typically lasts 2 to 3 years with several
18
options being explored. If it can be shown that the components can be
developed, then the engine concepts progress to the next stage,
advanced development.
During advanced development, new components are assembled and
tested as a unit to investigate component interactions and total system
performance. In addition to mechanical interfaces, thermodynamic and
aerodynamic compatibility must be insured. The technology selected for
engine qualification is generally consistent with the levels developed
in technology improvement programs. Advanced engine proposals must be
based upon proven concepts rather than having to prove individual
components during engineering development. This stage lasts about two
years, at the end of which one engine concept is selected for engineering
development. Prior to the go-ahead for engineering development, a
decision to commit to a new engine must be made and top management approval
of the engine specifications must be obtained.
The objective of the engineering development phase is to
demonstrate approved operational requirements with an entire engine system.
The engine evolves to its flight configuration and tests are undertaken
to certify the engine for production. During this stage, the airframe
manufacturers evaluate the suitability of the engine for new or derivative
aircraft designs. This stage typically corresponds in time to the beginning
of the airframe design and development cycle. The engineering development
stage normally lasts about 4 to 5 years, but it can be accelerated.
Certifying the engine for commercial use signals the end of this stage
and the start of production.
The production stage involves producing not only the engines
for initial installation on the airframe, but the spares and spare parts
which represent a major portion of the production run.
Airframe Development Process
The design and development cycle of the airframe manufacturers
consists of four stages as follows: (13)
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(1) The conceptual design stage during which the
aircraft is conceived
(2) The preliminary design stage during which the
layout and general configuration is defined
(3) The detailed design stage during which the
design is frozen and the detailed design is
completed
(4) The product.ion phase during ,,,hich the aircraft
is manufactured.
As shown in Figure 1, the conceptual design stage is usually
of short duration, approximately 1 to 6 months. It involves only a small
staff (as few as five people) who define the basic configuration of the
aircraft to meet the requirements of the probable customer. If the
design potentiallv meets the customer's requirements and receives appro\al
of the chiefs of advance design, the aircraft advances to the preliminary
design stage.
The preliminary design stage typically lasts 18 to 24 months.
However, this phase has been known to last longer, depending upon the
technical difficulty of the design, the urgency of the requirement for
a new airframe, and the number of compromises and iterations that must
be performed to reach a satisfactory solution. Both analytical and
experimental studies are conducted in this stage to resolve uncertainties
in the design. Approximately 5 to 10 percent of the development cost is
expended. This can amount to $50 to $100 million. In this stage of the
design, there is a strong interaction with the major airlines to refine
the initial requirements which were the basis of the conceptual design.
Negotiations are conducted with the engine manufacturers to reach an
acceptable engine performance for the airframe. After suitable trade-offs
petween the customer's requirements and the airframe performance are
achieved, the design is reviewed for production go-ahead, and the next
stage, detai'ed design.
The detailed design stage extends from production go-ahead
through the certification of the aircraft. There is an overlap with the
actual production of the aircraft because in commercial practice, the
20
first commercial flight occurs within a month after certification. From
production go-ahead to the first in-service flight typically requires
30 to 36 months for a derivative aircraft and 40 to 48 months for a new
aircraft. The last 12 months are devoted to certifying the aircraft.
During the peak of the detailed design stage, as many as 2,000 engineers
are employed.
The production phase begins about 18 months after production
go-ahead and involves first preparing the fabrication facility for
production. This stage employs the largest number of people and, if the
design is successful, it is the longest lasting stage of the development
process. Some current aircraft have remained in production with programmed
improvements for over 20 years. Typically, the production phase will last
as long as the total design and development process - about 7 years.
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ANALYSIS NETHODOLOGY
In previous sections, it was noted that the development of
commercial airframes and engines is a complex, long-term process involving
a large number of decisions regarding the selection of applicable tech-
nologies. These decisions are m6de by people who have a variety of scientific,
engineering, financial and legal backgrounds and bring a variety of viewpoints
to the decision-making process. The development of an appreciation of the
factors that influence decisions leading to the introduction of new technology,
and of the influences that various people and organizations have in the
development process, demands a detailed and highly structured investigation.
Such an investigation must, ho"ever, strike a reasonable balance between the
data requirements and the demands that can reasonably be requested of
knowledgeable people in the commercial aircraft industry. This balance was
accomplished through the development of a detailed analysis methodology prior
to discussions with people in the aircraft industry, followed by documentation
of findings and subsequent analyses. In this way, the interviewers were
prepared to obtain the significant data with minimal imposition on the time
of responsible aircraft industry executives.
The analysis methodology provides a vehicle for structuring and
analYZing the factors that influence commercial airframe and engine manu-
facturer's decisions regarding the introduction of new technology in commercial
aircraft. The implementation of this methodology involved five steps as
follows:
(1) Define the generic components of the analysis frame-
work related to decision making in the commercial
airframe and jet engine industry.
(2) Define, in detail, the subelements of the generic
components.
(3) Conduct interviews with key personnel in the major
U.S. commercial airframe and jet engine manufacturing
companies to gain understanding of their decision-
making processes regarding the introduction of new
technology.
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(4) Document the interview information by recording inter-
actions among the subelements of the analysis framework.
(5) Analyze the interactions of subelements of the generic
components to identify: (1) the key decision influencers,
and (2) the key barriers to innovation at each stage of
the airframe and jet engine development process.
Generic Components of the Analysis Framework
The analysis framework was synthesized to encompass four major
components. Since the objective was to develop an understanding of the
factors affecting the introduction of new technology in the engine and air-
frame manufacturing industry, the first major component was defined to be the
Design and Development Stages, through which new engines and airframes are
evolved. The second component is the set of Design Criteria that is used in
each Design and Development Stage. The third set of factors is the set of
participants termed "Decision Influencers", that affect the design criteria.
Finally, the last set of factors was defined to be Barriers to Innovation.
These factors influence the Decision Influencers directly in establishing the
Design Criteria and, consequently, the decisions that are made during air-
frame and engine development regarding the introduction of new technology.
The analysis framework is shown schematically in Figure 2. The
lIs indicate the existence of interactions between:
In Matrix A--A Design and Development Stage and a Design
Criterion
In ~latrix B--The same Design Criterion and a Decision
Influencer
In Matrix C--The Decision Influencer and a Barrier to
Innovation.
Thus, it is possible to say that the indicated Barrier to Innovation interacts
with the designated Design and Development Stage and similarly, that the
indicated Decision Influencer affects the Design and Development Stage. These
interactions may be more clearly illustrated after a few simple matrix
manipulations. That is, multiplication of matrices A and B yields a matrix
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directly relating Design and Development Stages to Dp,'ision Influencers.
The matrix entries are then the relative level of interaction of a Decision
Influencer with the corresponding design activity. Then, if we call this
resultant Matrix D and multiply it by Matrix C, the resultant matrix relates
the Barriers to Innovation to the Design and Development Stages. The
entries in this matrix indicate the relative level of interaction that a
barrier has with a corresponding design activity. We will see later how
these data are aggregated to identify key Decision Influencers and Barriers
to Innovation.
Subelements of the Analysis Framework Components
The second step in the development of the analysis methodology
involved decomposing each of the generic components discussed above into its
constituent elements. In the case of Design and Development Stages, this
involved discussions with airframe and engine manufacturers to arrive at a
representative set of stages for each, and then a series of design activities
within each stage. The results will appear in a later matrix.
Similarly, in the caSe of Design Criteria, discussions with manu-
facturers, as well as Battelle staff, experience was used to develop separate
sets of design criteria for airframe and jet engine development under the
general headings of Marl· -t, Economic, and Airframe or Engine Design Criteria.
The list of Decision Influencers for the airframe and engine manu-
facturers are reasonably parallel. They were developed from Battelle's
understanding of the agencies that influence aircraft design and our analysis
of the organizational structure of the manufacturers obtained from published
organization charts and through interviews with the manufacturers.
The lists of more than 50 Barriers to Innovation were generated
largely from a review of literature on the process of innovation and analysis
and resident familiarity with the histories of airframe and engine develop-
ment. Both lists contain nearly common sets of barriers under the titles
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General Technology Considerations, Economic Consideration, Social Considera-
tions, and Management Considerations. Each list also contains a set of
barriers specific to airframe or engine technology as appropriate.
Interviews With Airframe and Engine Manufacturers
During late July and early August, 1976, interviews were conducted
with key personnel of the two major U.S. commercial jet engine manufacturers
• Pratt & Hhitney Aircraft, East Hartford, Connecticut
• General Electric Company, Evandale, Ohio, and Lynn,
Massachusetts.
Interviews were also conducted with key personnel of the three major U.S.
commercial airframe manufacturers
• Boeing Commercial Aircraft Company, Renton, Washington
• Lockheed-California, Burbank, California
• Douglas Aircraft Company, Long Beach, California.
The purpose of these interviews was to obtain an improved current understanding
of the airframe and engine design processes of the criteria used by the
participants in the decision-making process, and of the factors that influence
the introduction of new technology in the development of new energy and cost
effective U.S. commercial aircraft.
Documentation of Interview Information
The interviews conducted by the Battelle staff with airframe and
engine manufacturers' personnel were first documented in internal trip
reports. From these reports, as well as current research papers obtained
from manufacturers and other sources, an interim working paper was developed
that categorizes the factors affecting future aircraft development through
their impact on the various types of organizations involved. As a second
documentation step, the interviewers were asked to fill out the sets of matrices
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*corresponding to those indicated in Figure 2. They were requested to fill
in only important interactions and in filling out the respective airframe
and engine matrices, to produce composite views of the three airframe and two
engine manufacturers. Thus, Figure A-I represents their perception of the
important interactions affecting the introduction of new technology in
commercial jet engines by Pratt & Whitney and General Electric. Similarly,
Figure A-2 represents the Boeing, Lockheed, and Douglas composite view of the
interactions among factors involved with the introduction of new technology
in commercial airframes.
This method of documentatiun requires the interviewers to rigorously
consider and make a judgment about each interaction in the complex decisi'"
process involved in the design and development of new engines and airframes.
It also facilitates recording the interactions that the interviewers are most
confident of, and through subsequent analysis, facilitates deriving the other
interactions.
Analysis of Interactions
Figures A-I and A-2 were designed to allow the interviewers to
document interactions between Barriers to Innovation and Decision Influencers,
between Decision Influencers and Design Criteria, and between Design Criteria
and Design and Development Stages. Appropriate matrix multiplication results
in matrices (see Appendix A, Figures A-3 through A-6) which show the inter-
actions between
• Decision Influencers and Commercial Jet Engine Design
and Development Stages
• Decision Influencers and Commercial Air Transport
Design and Development Stages
* These matrices, which contain the basic data used in the analysis of
interactions are presented in Appendix A as Figures A-I and A-2.
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• Barriers to Innovatio--' and Commercial Jet Engine Design
and Development Stag'
• Barriers to Innovatioi.l and Commercial Air Transport
Design and Development Stages.
As indicated in Appendix A, these interactions can be analyzed to arrive at
a ranking of the barriers to incorporation of new technology in future
commercial transport aircraft, and also provides a mechanism for identifying
the key decision influencers at various stages of development. The results
of this analysis are described in the following two sections that address
factors affecting the decision-making processes of manufacturers.
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DESCRIPTIO~ OF FACTORS AFFECTIKG THE DECISIO~-~~KING
PROCESSES OF ENGINE AND AIRF~ffi "~NUFACTURERS
The analysis methodology presente~ in the preceding section is
basically a scheme for systematically organizing a large body of information
so that it can be analyzed to arrive at a rank ordering of importance of
decision influencers at each stage of engine and airframe development, as
well as a rank ordering of the barriers to incorporation of new technology
in future commercial transport aircraft.
Tables I through 4 summarize the analytical results with regard
to the importance of barriers to innovation in commercial jet engine and air-
frame development. The top one-half of the barriers are ranked in Tables I
and 3 in order of descending importance for the engine and airframe develop-
ment cycles, respectively. Both the airframe and jet engine industries have
resolved a great many factors that are thought to be significant inhibitors
to the introduction of new technology in some industries. These potentially
significant barriers to innovation that have been largely overcome are
listed in Tables 2 and 4 in the inverse order of importance for the jet
engine and airframe industries, respectively. On the other hand, the factors
listed in Tables I and 3 (and particularly those near the top of Tables I
and 3) are currently significant inhibitors to the introduction of new tech-
nology, but many can be alleviated by continued conscious cooperative efforts
by the aircraft industry, the airlines, and the U.S. Government.
In addition to pres""ting the rank ordering of the importance of
barriers to innovation across all design and development stages, the first
four columns of each table indicate the ranks of the barriers within the
individual design and development stages involved with either commercial air-
frame or jet engine development. The fifth column presents these data as
trend lines indicative of how the ranking varies as a <levelopment program
evolves from its earliest design stage to production.
The entries in the last column indicate the source of the barrier
in terms of whether it is inherent to the manufacturer's organization (i.e.,
TABLE 1. KEY BARRIERS TO INNOVATION IN COMMERCIAL JET ENGINE DEVELOPMENT
{All Design and Development Stages)
~g
."
';1
~
:;<:
""
Rank in Design
imd DevelopmentS_
l! l!
• ~ •e • e~ E ~ ~ '" i0 .2
• ~ ~ ~ 1'!1!~ ;; •0... • .. ~ O(llU,i~~ •• " ~ ~c .... o> .~
" "
lU'5!' c a::-;:
~ ~ ~ a:: III E.g ii
"'S ~ •Rank Order • .~
.:': g-~] '0•
"
~(All Design 'E 0 • • "C~a;--& ~and Develop- ~ ... • 'm §O ~ ~> 0ment Stages) • ~ • ~ Q .= 0Barriers to Innovation w
'"
w ~
1 Cost of new technology installed in aircraft 1 4 1 1 1"'-...V p
2 Personal biases 3 7 5 21"'-...V ""'" E
2 Personalities of decisionmakers and willingness to take risks 3 7 5 21"'--V f-" E
2 Company traditions!personal ities 3 7 5 2"'-...V ""'" E
5 Lack of competition from other manufacturers in the use of nevv technology 7 14 11 7"'- ....-V P
6 Lack of trained maintenance personnel 9 12 B 51""- ./V a
6 Lack of accumulated experience base with new technology 9 12 B 5"'- ....-V E
• Time required to certify new technology 15 1 2 ·1/ --r- c
• Certifying the use of new technology by FAA for commercial aircraft 15 1 2 ·1/ -r-..... c
10 Lack of investment enthusiasm in a maturing industry {cash flow situation) 2 3. 31 81"-- ...- a
11 Time to implement technology on a production basis 17 3 • 12 1/ r--.... p
12 Conservative designs avoiding risk (due to publicity-afforded failure) may 6 34 2. 12
""-
a
not exploit the potential advantages of new technology
13 Lack of low-cost methods for composite structure fabrication and 19 6 • .,/ pnondestructive testing
,. Service-time required to develop confidence for designer and customer 13 27 ,. 12
"'-V
V p/o
acceptance of new technology
15 Liability considerations • 34 32 20
'"
/"" a
,. Airline reluctance to use new technology 11 32 29 20
'" --
a
,. Public reaction to new technology 11 32 29 20
""-
--
a
I. Integrated nacelle design 21 7 13 16 ./ ......
--
p
Llue to tne need for oact<;-up technOlogies, It IS difficult to exploit new 1/i""." technology to enable radically different vehicle configurations to be 2. 7 13 16 ........ Pdeveloped to reduce life-evcle costs
20 Turbine cooling 21
"
19 20
./ "'-... P
21 Foreign object impact resistance 2. 20 15 16
....-
V c
21 Disc containment 2. 20 15 16
./ C
23 Program management structure - matrix versus hierarchical 2. 19 15 15
./ p
2' Long lifetime design requirements for commercial aircraft 34 • 12 2. /
--
-.....
P/O
25 Lack of in~servicedemonstration as opposed to prediction of performance ,. 39 37 25
""- -
a
26 Turbine stage loading 31 20 23 25
./ P
27 Time at which technology is considered to be "available" is vastly different 32 23 24 27 / Pfor scientists, aircraft designers. and production specialists
*Source of Barrier is coded as follows:
P = Production and preceding stages of development.
C =Certification.
o == Operation.
E == Experience (tradition. preference, etc.)
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TABLE 2. BARRIERS TO INNOVATION IN COMMERCIAL JET ENGINE DEVELOPMENT
IN INVERSE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE
~
g
Rank in Design
and Development
S",,'"
E E
• 0 •E
• E i !a :g~ E ~c 0 ~ 0 -c -c CI - •,,,, ] 0 0; o;~~~
-!• • ] ~C C C -2 c +,o>-
• ('I:l.~ &i a: <:l~ ~ C m a: CIl E..c: ~ '"Rank Order 0 ~
.*
cO c..1il-c '0c e 5(All Design 'E .- .. 0 UJ c ~0 ~ c 1!~~-8.and Develop- ~ C. '0, wO CIl w ,
ment Stages) Barriers to Innovation x ~ c .= c ] 0~ w « w
'"
51 Rapid rate at which technology is changing 50 50 51 50 P
51 Lack of recognition of need for advancement 50 50 51 50 0
51 Lack of pressure from customeT$ for more economical equipment 50 50 51 50 0
51 Nonproprietary nature of results obtained through NASA's program 50 50 51 50 P
50 Export controls (CoCom listl 50 3. 47 50 1/ ........ I-... P
48 Adequacy of materials supply infrastructure 4' 48 44 44
.-
I-- P
48 Lack of training of production workers 48 48 44 44
.-
I--- P
46 Disposal of existing production machinery that may not be fully amortized 42 44 48 46
-r--... p
-
46 Lack of an identifiable production champion 42 44 48 46 "- P
45 The cost of tooling at all stages of manufacturing sequence using new 36 42 44 46
........
.........
p
technology
--44 Developing confidence of suppliers and customers that new technologies 33 50 48 46
'"
P
are sufficientl\! advanced to justify the use Cif new materials or processes
43 Market uncertainty for type and quantity of new aircraft 2. 44 43 42
'"
P
3. Material characteristics 44 27 33 37 / ....... ......... P
39 Blade manufacturability 44 27 33 37 / ........'- P
3. seal design 44 27 33 37 / ....... ....... P
3. NIH factors 44 27 33 37 / ........ ....... P
38 Union objections to changing technology 23 44 42 42
"-
P
37 Cost of demonstration programs 30 42 3. 31
"- .--
,.- C
34 Patentllicense considerations 17 3. 41 41 I'-.. P
34 Difficulty in recruiting adequately trained designers, production personnel, 40 23 24 27 / - petc" who can work with new technology
34 Lack of experience in production adds to uncertainty and risk 40 23 24 27 / P
32 Lack of production machinery infrastructure to produce machinery for 35 23 24 27 / pnew technology
32 Disposal or conversion of production facilities for conventional technology 27 38 38 31
""-
.-- P
2. Relatively small performance savings associated with any particular compo- 36 14 20 33 / ....... ......... pnent combined with the need to take incremental steps in innovative design
2. Bearing!rotor design 36 14 20 33 / '-"'- P
2. Historic design practices are favored 36 14 20 33 / ....... ......... P
28 Financing of new production facilities when visibility is limited on aircraft 19 34 40 36
"-
Pprocurement and rates
*Source of Barrier is coded as follows:
P = Production and preceding stages of development.
C "" Certification.
o = Operation.
E = Experience {tradition, preference, etc.)
,
E
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TABLE 3. KEY BARRIERS TO INNOVATION IN COMMERCIAL AIRFRAME DEVELOPMENT
(All Design and Development Stages)
~
;I
'!i
'"
""~
Rank in Design
and Development
Stages
~ ill -:g
" "
t!"'gg' '5 •.~ ,~ o <I>~:5:en .~~
" ":'::= ... 0>-
" "
.~ 16.~ cO::::p
".. ~ " a:Ql~"6~ "'
"Rank Order
, 0
.!: ': g.t1'J-g '015.
"
~ jj(All Design • 'E
'"
-g~~~~ e0 .~ ,and Develop-
" £ ~ QlOQl Ql ,0 E ~ 0 ~ ,zment Stages) Barriers to Innovation
" "
~
1 Long lifetime design requirement for commercial air transports 1 1 2 2 P/O
1 Service-time required to develop confidence for designer and customer 2 2 1 1 P/O
acceptance of new technology
3 Liability considerations 6 • 3 7l..-L.-"
""'"
0
• Certifying the use of new technology by FAA for commercial aircraft • 3 5 • ....... C
• Cost of demonstration programs 5 6 • 6 C
6 Company traditions/personalities 7 7 7 2 / E
7 Execessive qualification testing and proof testing 3 5 • 26 t-- ........ C
8 Lack of investment enthusiasm in a maturing industry leash flow situation) 8 11 5 2 ~ ...... 0
• Market uncertainty for type and quantity of new aircraft • 12 11 5 ....... -'
...... P
10 Lack of competItion from ather manufacturers in the use of new technology 10 10 8 • P
10 Historic design practices are favored 11 8 • 8 P
12 Lack of demonstrated hardware reliabilitY 11 • ,. 13 -
-
0
Time at which technology is considered "available" is vastly different for l..- ?13 scientists, aircraft desianers, and production soecialists 15 13 12 • ~ P
13 Developing confidence of suppliers and customers that new technologies are 15 13 12 • V ...- Psuffjcientl advanced to justify the use of new material or oroces.ses
15 Cost of new technoloav installed in aircraft 13 16 16 13 P
Due to the need for back~up technologies, it is difficult to exploit new
,/ -16 technology to enable radically different vehicle configurations to be 17 17 15 15
-
P
develo eel to reduce life-cvcle cost
17 Lack of accumulated experience base with new technology
"
13 2. 27 E
18 Repair or replacement of composite structures after accident (e.g., fire) 18 ,. 20 18
- '"
0
,. Rapid rate at which technology is changing ,. ,. 17 20 P
,. Lack of experience in production adds to uncertainty and risk ,.
"
17 20 P
21 Lack of low-cost methods for composite structure fabrication and 21 18 20 25 P
nondestructive testin" ......
22 Personal biases 23 22 17 15
-
E
23 Personalities of decisionmakers and willingness to take risks 25 23 20 15
-'
E
2. Lack of in-service demonstration as opposed to prediction of performance 25 2. 25 20 ./'1 0
25 Lack of identifiable product champion 27 26 25 2. P
2. Development of system design requirements 23 25 28 30
-
-..~ P
'""Source of Barrier is coded as follows:
P == Production and preceding stages of development.
C == Certification.
o = Operation.
E = Experience (tradition, preference, etc.)
8
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TABLE 4. BARRIERS TO INNOVATION IN COMMERCIAL AIRFRAME DEVELOPMENT
IN~ ORDER OF IMPORTANCE
Rank in Design
and Development
Stages
- m "lI
0 0 ~"C ~ - •
-oJ' Jl,~ ~ OlllCf.l:: ,~~ 5 0
'i ~5,'l:C>-.m'_Q,la:~ 01
.. ~
"
0 a:: ;:; E..l: Q,l
Rank Order E- o ,E':]-&-g '00 1l jj(All Design 'E •• 0 "CQ,lQ,l~<I>
"
0 '~ ~ ~o ~ -iand Develop- 0 ~ ~ 0ment Stages) 0 ~Barriers to Innovation <.>
"
>- E
50 Nonproprietary nature of results obtained through NASA's program 50 50 50 50 P
50 Lack of pressure from customers for more economical equipment 50 50 50 50 0
50 Program management structure - matrix versus hierarchical 50 50 50 50 P
49 Export controls (CoCom list) 4. 4. 4. 4. P
4. Relatively small performancE! savings associated with any particular compo- 4. 4. 4. 4. P
nent combined with the need to take incremental steps in innovative design
47 Public reaction to new technology 47 47 47 45 0
46 Improved preliminary design weight estimate and payoff methods 46 46 46 47 P
44 Patent/license considerations 44 43 45 45 P
44 Disposal of existing production machinery that may not be fully amortized 45 45 43 41 P
43 Lack of recognition of need for advancement 43 43 .. 41 0
42 Cost of establishing property matrix of composite materials 42 42 42 44 P
41 Developirrg low-cost methods for fabricating high-quality composite 41 41 41 41 Pstructures
40 Time to implement technology on a production basis 37 37 40 40 P
37 The cost of tooling at all stages of manufacturing sequence using new 37 37 36 32
-
Ptechnology
37 Lack of production machinery infrastructure to produce machinery for 37 37 36 32
-
Pnew technology
37 Adequacy of materials sUPllly infrastructure 37 37 36 32
-
P
36 Difficulty in recruiting adequately trained designers, production personnel, 36 36 33 31
-
P
etc., who can work with new technology
35 Lack of trained maintenance personnel 32 35 36 37 r-I- 0
33 Dimct substitution of parts (composites for metalsl does not allow 33 33 34 32 Ponportunitv in design to exploit advantageous characteristics of composites
33 Conservative designs avoiding risk (due to publicity afforded failure} may 33 33 34 32 0
not exploit the potential advantages of new technology
32 inancing of new production facilities when visibility is limited on aircraft 33 32 27 20 /-
-
p
procurements and rates
30 Interface of composites with metallic structures (e.g., complex, costly ioints) 2. 29 31 3.
--
P/O
~evelopment of advanced deSign and manutacturing tech_nologles for
--
30 large airframe structures to reduce number of joints and fasteners and 2. 29 31 3. P
hence natt count
29 NIH factors 2. 31 2. 29 P
2. Disposal or conversion of production facilities for conventional technology 31 27 23 ,.
.-
...- P
27 Airline reluctance to use new technology 22 27 30 27 -....
.......
-
0
,
i
'"-
""Source of Barrier is coded as follows:
P :: Production and preceding stages of development.
C :: Certification.
o :: Operation.
E :: Experience (tradition, preference, etc.) I~
~
~
{'l
,
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Production), to the airlines (i.e., Operation), to the certification process,
or to factors related to historical precedence and tradition (i.e.,
Experience). This type of classification facilitates some general comments
about the barriers and where action might be directed to reduce them. It is
worth noting, for example, that all but one of the engine and airframe
certification- or experience-related barriers fall in Tables 1 (Engines) and
3 (Airframes). That is, they are in the top half of the barriers when ranked
in order of decreasing importance. Clearly, the uncertainties, time, and
costs associated with certifying equipment using new technology are a matter
of concern to the engine and airframe manufacturers.
The experience-related barriers result from traditions and
preferences exhibited by both the manufacturers and airlines. The manufacturers
tend to maintain design techniques and materials usages across generations of
aircraft--often for very legitimate reasons in terms of design and production
staff capability, and in terms of marketing aircraft with which the operators
can identify. The airlines do not have any particular enchantment with the
introduction of new technology with which they may have little familiarity
and confidence, and \,hich may result in only incremental improvement on their
return on investment over that obtained with current designs.
It is also apparent from an examination of the last column in
Tables 2 (Engines) and 4 (Airframes) that the majority of the potentially
less critical barriers originate with manufacturers, and to a lesser extent,
with the airlines. The fact that these barriers are of low rank relative to
those that appear in Tables 1 and 3 is interpreted to mean that the manu-
facturers and airlines have taken actions and developed programs to reduce
their potentially negat~;ve effect on the introduction of new technology in
airframe and engine development.
Inspection of the last column in Tables 1 through 4 reveals that
the large majority of barriers to innovation originate with the engine and
airframe manufacturers, either directly or indirectly through their perception
of the business environment "ithin which they operate. Ifhile many of these
barriers have been overcome, the last column in Tables 1 and 3 indicate that
approximately one-half of the important barriers originate with the manufacturers.
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These barriers cover a wide range of topics ranging from market uncertainty
for the type of aircraft required, to technical factors such as the need to
carry through parallel designs with conventional technology as a backup
should the new technology designs not prove feasible. These topics are not
easily categorized, though most are associated in one way or another with the
costs, time and risk factors associated with introducing new technology.
Influences on Engine Development
A detailed examination of Tables 1 and 2 results in an interesting
profile of the jet engine manufacturers which is quite different from that
of the airframe manufacturers. The engine manufacturers are first and fore-
most concerned with the cost of new technology installed in the aircraft.
The manufacturer's primary concern is that ne,,, technology should result in
reduced life-cycle costs to the user. Today, the user usually has a choice
of several engines for any given airframe and base their choice on life-cycle
costs. To take the step of introducing new technology, the engine man"-
facturers must be convinced that new technology will be cost effective over
the life of the airframe. This is, of course, very difficult to accomplish
and, consequently, acts as a barrier to the introduction of new technology.
The barriers ranked 2 through 6 are indicative of the conservative
nature of the engine manufacturers, their long experience in the engine
field, and concern for the reputation of their companies as reflected by the
quality of the products they produce.
The next four barriers in Table 1 reflect the engine manufacturers'
concern for proper timing of their developments. In general, the timing
uncertainties that result when new technology is incorporated in an engine
create a barrier to the introduction of technology.
Probably due to the long development time for jet engines and the
ultimately higher production total of engines as compared to airframes, the
engine manufacturers tend to view technical items, and service and warranty
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factors as less significant than do the airframe manufacturers. The develop-
ment of technical items is a nonrecurring cost in the engine development
process and can be amortized over the entire production run of the original
equipment engines and replacement engines. Service and warranty factors are
considered to be less critical because of the long development effort
afforded engines and the manufacturers' resultant confidence in their products.
In general, the engine manufacturers are well aware of barriers to
innovation and have taken steps to alleviate them. Each of the barriers
identified in Table 1 are commented on in Table 5 with respect to the steps
that the engine manufacturers have, or are, taking to alleviate them. As dis-
cussed in Table 5, the engine manufacturers use two major mechanisms for
reducing the production-related barriers to introducing new engine technology.
These mechanisms are:
(1) Product improvement programs used to develop tech-
nology for current engines.
(2) Advanced technology programs aimed at the development
of new engines.
In accomplishing these programs, the manufacturers have evolved
organizational structures and procedures in direct response to some of the
key b2rriers listed in Table 5. For example, they:
(1) Utilize a matrix organization of multidisciplinary
project teams to explore several alternative technologies
in the course of developing satisfactory improved com-
ponents or new engine concepts.
(2) Use experienced development engineers to take concepts
generated in preliminary design and develop them into
production-line items with a minimum of delays. In
addition, teams of R&D specialists, designers, production
specialists, and maintenance specialists are brought
together to develop new concepts, such as low-cost
fabrication techniques, nondestructive inspection pro-
cedures, and engine diagnostic techniques.
To demonstrate to airframe manufacturers and airlines that new technologies
are ready for implementation, the engine manufacturers conduct extensive ground
tests and demonstrations of newly developed engines or components.
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TABLE 5. KEY BARRIERS TO IN~;oVATION A.'ill INTERACTIONS tilTH
MAXUFACTI:RERS I ·PROGRP-JiS
(CO~NERCL\L JET EXGU;E DE\'ELOPHENT)
Rank
Ord~r
I
2.
2b
2c
5
6a
6b
8a
8b
Ba~riers to Innovation
Cost of new technology installed
in aircraft
Personal biases
Personalities of decisionmakers
and willingness to take risks
Company traditions/personalities
Lack of competition from other
manufacturers in the use of new
technology
Lack of trained maintenance
personnel
Lack of accumulated experience base
with new technology
Time required to certify new
technology
Certifying the use of new tech-
nology by FAA for commercial
aircraft
Interaction With Hanufacturers 1 programs
The manufacturers ffiUSt demonstrate to the
airlines that ne....· technologies are avail-
able at lower cost on a life-cycle cost
basis than current technology.
The stability and service organization of
U.S. engine manufacturers accompanied by an
excellent product and good management
practice has resulted in world leadership
in this area. The manufacturers must eval-
uate ne~ technology options early in the
development process and make comparisons
",ith prov~n technologies on an objective
technical and economic basis.
The competition to correctly time the intro-
duction of a new design 1s the critical com-
petitiv~ factor. Only a limited amount of
new technology is likely to be introduced in
a new design because of the conservative
nature of the few companies involved and the
large investment risked tn the development
of a new engine.
Manufacturers have developed information
dissemination programs to educate airline
maintenance personnel on maintenance and
repair procedures for new materials and new
equipment.
Manufacturers require supportive funds to
gain experience with new tEchnologies. They
obtain these funds both from Government con-
tracts and in-house funds from profits.
Historically, military experi~nce has con-
tributed significantly to commercial jet
engine dev~lopment.
The engine manufacturers have developed
real-time digital computer methods to reduce
the time required to analyze certification
test data. They also are studying r.lethods
to cause simulated failures rather than
destructively test engines to certify them
as safe.
Engine manufacturers must continually keep
FAA aware of the latest ad~ances in new
technology applications to avoid extended
delays in receiving FAA approvals for its
use.
TABLE 5.
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Ra.nk
Order
10
11
Barriers to Innov~tion
Lack of investment enthusiasm in a
matudng industry (cash flow
situation)
Time to implement technology on a
production basis
InteractioIl With H.:mufacturcrs' Progr<lms
The lack of investment in the aircraft
industry is caused by the current financial
condit!cn of thQ 'lirlines. Potentially,
technical develop:';L!nts such .':IS improved
engine components and an enC'rgy-
efficient engine should result in 10ng-
term economic benefits to the airlines.
Engine manufacturers assign older engineers
to develop ideas conceived by younger
analysts because they have the design and
production experience to reduce the time
required for new technology to reach pro-
duction.
12
13
14
15
16.
16b
18
19
Conservative designs avoiding risk
(due to publicity-afforded failure)
may not exploit the potential
advantages of new technology.
Lack of low-cost methods for com-
posite structure fabrication and
nondestructive testing.
Service~time required to develop
confidence for designer and customer
acceptance of new technology.
Liability considerations
Airline reluctance to use new
technology
Public reaction to new technology
Integrated nac~lle design
Due to the need for back-up
technologies. it is difficult to
exploit ncr,.,' technol"gy to ell.3ble
radically different vehicle con-
figurations to be developed to
reduce life-cycle costs.
Engine manufacturers have a reputation for
being conservative. However. because of
inherently long developw.ent cycles for new
engines. theY usually have orderly proced-
ures to examine every aspect of a new tech-
nology before committing it to a production
engine.
ManufacturerS have teams of scientists,
designers, production and maintenance
specialists assigned to the develop~ent of
low-cost, competitive methods for fabrica-
tion and ~DT of modular engine components.
ManufacturerS have in-house programs to
develop new engine technologies and to
obtain statiC test experience on critical
components. Hm,;(·ver. more extensive demon-
strations are n(· ded to develop customer
acceptance of new technolou'.
New interpretations of product liability
lalo.·$ have caused manufacturers to become
very cautiouS about the introduction of new
technology into civil transport engines.
ManufacturerS have new engine development
programs for derivative aircraft ...:hic.h the
airlines are reluctant to accept. This
re1uctnnce is based on problems encountered
with introduction of the first generation of
high by-~ass ratio engines.
llliere the technology is apparent to the
public, the airlines arc reluctant to
introduce a ne\o; technology beCause
of possible negative public reaction.
The potentially energy efficient turbo-
prop engine may fall in this category.
ManufacturerS have in-house studies related
to integrated nacelle design for CrOL air-
craft engines.
During the development of a radically new
cnr-inc, several alternative technologies are
studied <lnd evalu.1.ted until the technology
demonstration ph;lse of exploratory dl'velop-
ment. At. this time, the most promising
tcchnolof,icR arc selected for developmcnt.
For eXCtmple. in the development of the J-79
engine, three mc·thods for controll ing the
airflow into the compressors were evaluated.
Rank
Order
20
21a
21b
23
24
25
26
TABLE 5.
Barriers to Innovation
Turbine cooling
Foreign object impact resistance
Disc containment
Program management structure--
matrix versus hierarchical
Long lifetime design requirements
for commercial aircraft
Lack of in-service demonstration
as opposed to prediction of
performance
Turbine stage loading
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Interaction With Hanufacturers' Programs
The manufacturers are investigating methods
for improving film cooling and for making
transpiration cooling practical for turbine
blade cooling. They are also developing
matrix materials to inCl"'laSe their resis-
tance to the high tempc;-:,ture environment of
engine turbines.
This is a problem for all engines. The
engine manufacturers have investigated
several techniques to save weight in
turbofan engines by introducing composite
fan blades. However, they have not
yet devised a composite fan blade to
withstand foreign object damage tests.
Manufacturers have the disc containment in
hand with conventional technology. How-
ever, attempts to reduce the weight with
new materials while maintaining the same
level of integrity are required.
Engine manufacturers use project teams in
a matrix organization to study technology
options before committing to the develop-
ment of a new engine. They feel that the
matrix type of organization is most appro-
priate for managing engine development
programs.
Engine manufactu~eis warranty hot parts
of the engine for at least 2,500 hours and
cold parts up to 30,000 hours. rhe disc of
JT9D has a service life of 15,000 cycles/
25,000 hours. Manufacturers have product
improvement programs to extend component
life or improve performance based on airline
in-service reports.
Manufacturers are developing improved engine
monitoring and diagnosti~ techniques to
obtain information needed to minimize engine
performance degradation.
The development of a new engine requires the
analysis of single sta~e versus mUlti-stage
turbines for maximum work efficiency. ihis
trade-off ts made in the preliminary design
phase of engine development.
27 Time at ""hieh technology is con-
sidered to be "available" is
vastly different far scjentists,
aircraft designers, and production
specialists.
Manufacturers have formed teams consisting
of scientists, designers, and production
specialists fo accelerate the acceptance of
a neW technology for production.
39
The traditions and biases that develop in mature organizations
frequently become barriers to innovation. They are addressed by the engine
manufacturers through multiple development programs and efforts are made to
sell the new technology when i~ appears to be more profitable than old tech-
nology. Also, they have in-house or contracted study programs to explore the
possible advantages of new technologies before committing them to engine
applications.
To help alleviate the lengthy process of certification, engine
manufacturers have developed real-time data analysis techniques to reduce
the tedium of test data reduction, and to accelerate the analysis phase of
certification.
Operational barriers to technology have two major sources; the
user's past experience with the introduction of new technology, and the
exposure to large financial risk based on recent product liability cases.
The introduction of the wide-body jets and their new high-bypass-ratio turbo-
fan engines created excessive maintenance burdens and schedule delays for
the airlines. Ne'. interpretations of product liability laws have caused
engine manufacturers to become very cautious about the introduction of new
technology into civil transport engines. The manufacturers are aware of these
problems. They have established orderly procedures during the engine certifi-
cation stage to identify and minimize potential first-time usage problems
during the introduction of new products. They also offer information
dissemination programs to educate the users on new technologies and provide
technology support programs on a world-wide basis.
Decision Influencers in Jet Engine Development
In addition to the barriers to innovation in jet engine development
that are discussed above, the analysis methodology yields a rank ordering of
the importance of decision influencers at each stage of the engine develop-
ment process. These decision influencers and their rank order are presented
in Table 6. The first four columns at the right side of the table indicate
the rank order of importance of the decision influencer in each stage. The
fifth column presents these data as trend lines to indicate how the ranking
changes as the program evolves.
40
TABLE 6. RANK ORDER OF IMPORTANCE OF DECISION INFLUENCERS IN
COMMERCIAL JET ENGINE DEVELOPMENT ACROSS ALL DESIGN
AND DEVELOPMENT STAGES
Rank in Design
and Development
~ge~_.----r_+ ....
0>
c:
.~
!l
.!:
0>
c:
UJ
....
c:
'"E
0-
o
~
Cl
~
~
o
1i.
x
UJDecision Influencer
Rank Order
(All Design
and Develop-
ment Stages)
c:
0>
.~
Cl----~-------------~~
co
c:
'E
a;
~
0..
1
2
8 1 1 1 V
1 5 2 2 .........
3 Airframe Manufacturers 2 5 2 3,....". ....
4 Executive Officer* 3 5 5 4'-
5 Manager, Preliminary Design
and Develonment* 10 2 2 61/ ..........
6 Board of Directors* 6 5 10 61--
6 Finance Director* 6 5 10 6
8 Marketing Director* 4 11 10 6r"-, __
9 Project Director* 11 10 6 5 L....... -
10 Strategic Planning Director" 4 11 14 11 I'-....
13 2 7 11 I./-r-.
11
11
Legal Director"
Department of Defense
9 11 13 11
11
14
15 Department of Commerce 13 11 14 11
15 Department of State 13 11 14 11
-
L_~1:5~_i~M~a~n~a~g,:e~r,~M~an~u~f~a~ct~u:o:r:o:in~g~S::e~rv~ice~s*::""-__...L.:1~3~~1~1.L~14~_1~1~~::r::::::"'k:'"
*Jet Engine Manufacturer
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The airlines exert a strong influence throughout the design and
development stages. Their influence diminishes somewhat only in the explor-
atory development stage, where the component technology to meet the air-
·line's requirements is developed.
The airframe manufacturer rates high as an influencer of the engine
manufacturer because in a sense, he is a customer of the engine manufacturer.
The engine manufacturer must size his engine to meet the projected require-
ments of the airframe manufacturer.
After concepts are developed based on inputs from the airlines,
the airframe manufacturers, the Marketing Director and the Strategic Planner,
the Chief of Engineering assumes control of the project and exerts the
strongest influence on the introduction of technology and on the whole
development process for a new engine.
The Executive Officer of the engine manufacturers exerts his
influence early in the development stages and maintains his awareness and
influence throughout the program. Here the dominant personality COmes into
play. It will be seen in the next section that this is in marked contrast
to the decision-making process in the airframe industry. It probably is
best attributed to the style of doing business in the engine area. While
the "domin'.:Clt personality" leaders have largely left the airframe companies,
they still exist in the aircraft engine companies. Also, the Finance
Director and Board of Directors have a much stronger role in engine develop-
ment than their counterparts in the airframe industry.
As indicated in Table 6, the ~lanager of Preliminary Design and
Development is heavily influenced by the inputs from the previously discussed
personnel during the preliminary design stage of a new component or engine.
However, once he and his design team develop new concepts, he strongly
influences the next two stages of the project where the component technology
and engine technology are validated.
The Marketing Director exerts his strongest influence during
Preliminary Design and as the engine is being considered for production.
The Strategic Planner, who does not have an identifiable counter-
part in the airframe manufacturers, exerts his influence in Preliminary
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Design and then bows out of the picture because he is responsible for long-
term (15 to 20 years) forecasting of the market place and the preparation of
long-term company plans for product development.
The influence of the Project Director in the engine manufacturer's
organization is similar to that of the airframe manufacturer except that his
ranking within the development process is not as high (moderate as opposed
to strong) within the respective organizations.
The Legal Director makes his presence known by evaluating the
risks and liabilities associated with introducing new technology; however, he
apparently does not play a major role in influencing the decisions during
engine development.
The Department of Defense and NASA play an unusually strong role in
the Exploratory Development stage of jet engines. Historically, the military
has funded the development of engine technology that eventually was intro-
duced into civil transport engines. Now, the manufacturers increasingly look
to NASA for funding to support these developments because engines being
developed for military requirements have diverged from the requirements of
civil transports.
The FAA and EPA exert their influence in the Advanced Development
stage because there the new and old technology components are integrated
and operated as a proplllsion unit. At this point in time, the manufacturer
demonstrates that he can meet the safety, nOise, and pollution regulations
imposed on his engine by these agencies.
The Department of Commerce and Department of State have little
influence on the technology development for jet engines. However, they do
exert an indirect influence on the production decisions because today's
engine·market is international in scope and the manufacturer must be responsive
to Government policies.
Influences in Airframe Development
Tables 3 and 4 indicate that the major barriers to innovation in
the airframe industry are somewhat different from those' factors that concern
43
the jet engine manufacturers. The three highest ranked barriers shown in
Table 3 indicate that the foremost concern of the airframe manufacturers are
the long service life and extreme reliability that they must guarantee to
the airlines. The current fleet of commercial jet transport aircraft has set
a precedent in the transportation industry with regard to both airframe life
and engine reliability. The technologies involved are proven, maintenance
skills and procedures are established, and the support services and
warranties provided by the manufacturers are unparalleled by any other trans-
portation equipment vendor. These conditions must be matched or exceeded by
any airframe or engine vendor who wishes to introduce new technology, and it
must be don" in a way that convinces the airlines of its financial advantages
while incurring little or no risk to the airlines. The latter consideration
is of particular importance in these days of marginal airline profitability.
Unexpectedly high operating or maintenance costs associated with a new air-
craft can seriously jeopardize an airline's existence. Also, with large
passenger capacities and high court liability judgments, a catastrophic accident
can literally bankrupt an airline.
The next 11 barriers, which rank 4 through 13 in Table 3, may be
interpreted as a major concern by airframe manufacturers for the very high
nonrecurring costs associated with introducing new technology in an airfl~ame.
Because of the small production run for airframes relative to engines
(several hundred as opposed to several thousand), the nonrecurring cos Lv are
of significantly more concern to the airframe manufacturers than to the
engine manuLtcturers. This) combined with market uncertainties, and a con-
servative attitude on the part of the airlines with regard to accepting new
technology, tends to result in an evolutionary acceptance of new technology
in airframe design.
The remaining 12 barriers shown on Table 3 are mixed, but several
of them, along with a number of the higher ranked barriers shown in Table 4,
are related to recurring costs; both in production and maintenance of the air-
frames. Uncertainties associated with the cost of manufacture using new
technologies such as composite secondary and primary structure, as well as
the cost to the airlines of maintaining such structures, may lead to con-
servative decisions regarding the introduction of this new airframe technology.
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As was the case for the commercial jet engine manufacturers, the
airframe manufacturers have instituted steps to help overcome many of the
barriers listed in Tables 3 and 4. These actions are briefly discussed in
Table 7.
Operations related barriers, such as questions of liability,
investment enthusiasm, and aircraft maintenance, which rank relatively high
in the listing, are all addressed to the extent possible in the manufacturers'
programs. By supporting engineering developments of new technologies, they
attempt to reduce the risk associated with introduction of new technology
into future commercial aircraft. However, it is not possible to substantially
reduce two of the major barriers (i. e., "Liability Considerations" and "Lack
of Investment Enthusiasm in a Maturing Industry") without major demonstrations
of satisfactory use of the new technology and an improved economic picture
for the airlines.
The cirframe manufacturers continue to seek new ideas for improved
airframe fabrication to maintain their superior international position. In
contrast to the engine manufacturers, barriers caused by personal bias and
tradition rank relatively low, probably because the airframe pioneers who
were the powerful leaders in the growing aviation industry have died or
retire~, and the new leaders have taken proactive steps to overcome personal
biases (e.g., creating teams of R&D, design, and production personnel to
solve problems and using matrix management for projects).
The manufacturers are now evolving a broad-based working knowledge
of composite structures for civil transport applications. They have used
composites extensively in non-flight-critical components of the aircraft with
good success. Company teams of scientists, designers, and production
specialists have been formed to accelerate the acceptance of new technology
for production. Programs are implemented to enhance the acceptance of
advance composite structure by demonstrating the lower cost fabrication
methods.
However, in the area of long-lifetime design, the manufacturers
are almost at cross purposes. They now are developing techniques to more
than double the lifetimes of current transport airframes using conventional
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TABLE 7. KEY 1\"~I{Jr:RS TO IS~OV"TION Mm INTERACTlONS WI11l
MANUFACTLli:ERS' I'ROt:f{,\~IS
(Cro~Ir.RCJAL AIRFRAHE DE\'ELOPMENT)
Rank
Order
la
Ib
3
4a
4b
6
8
9
Barriers to Innovation
Long ItfctiDc design requirement
for commercial air transports.
Service-ti~c required to develop
confidence for designer and
custOM.cr accl'pLmce of new tech-
nology.
Liability considerations
Certifying the usc of new tech-
nology by rlv\ for cor.~c[cial air-
craft
Cost of demonstration ?rogra~
Company traditions!pcrsomlitics
Excessive qu~llflcation testing and
proof testing
Lack of invcst~cnt cnthusiasn In a
malurln~ industry (cash {lo~
situation)
~Iarket unc:crtaillty fQr type and
quantity of nc~ ~trcraft
Interactions With ~l.:Hlufac:turers' Progr,1ms
Airfram~ ~~nufacturers need to establish
strong R&T programs to demonstrate to air-
lines that new airfr<lme technologies c",n
provide st~nificant long-lived ?erf~rmance
improvement over convention"'l technologies
at lower Costs. This ~ill be a difficult
task now that airlines believe that they
can increase the service life of current
aircraft up to 80,000 hours and operate
the~ economically.
Hanuf<lcturers have in-house progra~~ to
develop new airframe technologies and to
obtain in-flight service experience on non-
flight-critical components. However. more
extensive demonstrations, are needed to
develop customer accept<lnce of new
technology involving flight-critical
components.
New interpretations of product liability
laws have caused the ~anufacturers to be-
COme very cautious about the introduction of
new technology into civil transports because
of the financial risk and the airline's
reluctance to buy ai~c.af~ that depart from
proven technologies.
Ai.framC manufacturers must continually
keep 'fAA <1 ....are of the latest advances in
new technology applications and their
experiencc with d~mon~tration programs to
avoid extended delays in receiving FAA
approvals for its use.
Airframe manufacturers must continue to
find ....ays to reduce the cost of new tech-
nology demonstration programs.
The stability of U.S. civil transport air-
frame companies relative to for~ign manu-
facturers accompanied by excellent
products and Rood management practice has
made them the world leaders. TIle managers
must continue to evallJ<lte new technologies
against proven technologies on an objective
technical and economic basis.
Hanufacturers arc developing analytical
methods based on cxperimental dat~ '-ihich can
be used to accelerate test procedures and
reduce cos ts.
The lack of investment in the aircraft
industry is caQ~ed by the current financL~l
position of the airlines. Potentially. the
development a~d introduction of cnerp.y-
effic.l{'nt transports could have long-t('rm
economic benefits.
The m~rketin~ staffs 0f manufacturers have
developed s0phJsticatcd de:Jland forecasting
techniques to minimize thE.- risk of
co~~ittlng to a ne.... or derivative aircraft
production run.
TABLE 7.
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Rank
Order
lOa
lOb
12
13a
13h
15
16
17
18
Barriers to Innovation
Lack of co~~etition from other
manufacturers In the USe of new
technology
Historic design practices are
favored
Lack of de~nstratcd hardware
reliabllit}"
Time at ~hich technology is con-
sidered "available" 1s vastly
different for scientists, aircraft
designers, and production
specialists.
Developing confidence of suppliers
and customers that ncw technologies
arc sufficiently advanced to
justify the use of new material or
processes.
Cost of new technology installed
In aircraft
Due to the need for b.1Ck-up tech-
nologies, it is difficult to exrloit
new Lechnology to enahle radically
different vehicle config~rations to
be developed to reduce life-cycle
costs.
Lack of accumulated experience base
with ne~ technology
Repair or replacement of composite
structures after accident (e.g.,
fire).
Inter~ctlon ~ith Manuracturcr~' rr~~rams
The CO!:1petjtion to corrl:?ctly time the intro-
dtJ<~tion of a new design is the critic;!; corn-
petitive f;lC:tor. BCC'o1use all m;lllufacturC'rS
arc o;}slc;llly r.ll~lli.Tr Idth t('cl,nic,11
innovations, enly .1 limited a~j('Hmt (If
unique technology is likely to u" intro-
duced ill (lily particular nc·... aircri.lft.
Manufi.lcturers break away fro~ historic design
practices I.'hen they h.'lve gilincd ;). working
familiarity ...·ith the ne...· technology ':lild can
objectively evaluate it vis-."l-vis historic
practices.
The manufacturers must aem0nstrate that new
technologies, such as active control
systems, as reliable as current technology.
Hi.lnufactucers have formed tc~~s consisting
of scientists, designers, and production
specialists to accelerate the acceptance
of a new technology for production
For exn~ple, airframe manuf.lcturers must
convince suppliers that th~rc is a
sufficient market for advance composite
materii.lls at competitive prices. Further,
the)' must convince airlines that the
advance composites will not become a
mainteni.lnce .'lna operations burden with
attendant increased costs.
The manufacturer ~ust demonstrate to the
airlines that ~pw technolo~ies will result
in lower costs on a life-cycle cost basis
than would current technology.
Nc...• technolo.';ies are introduced in a devel-
opment program on a substitution basis
because back-up technologies based on
current st.1te of the art must be available
to avoid d~lnvs In the pro?rum. Full
advantaRc of a n~v techno lor-v Ci.lnnot result
until a sufficient experience base exists
to take adV;lOt;j~e of the' unique design
possibilities inherent in the technology.
~1nufi.lcturcrs solicit supportive funds to
gain experience with ne~ technologies and,
in addition, utilize corpOrate funds to
support technology develol)ll:ent.
Manufnctur('rs mllst demonstrate to the air-
lines that advance compos:l.te materials are
simple and in('xpcnsive to repair. The
det('rlor.1tion of mechanical propertieS of
composites '...hen exposed to high hC'at re-
mains a hi.lrrier to their \ltilizi.ltion in
structural ~ompnnentS.
Rank
Order
19a
19b
21
22
23
24
25
26
TABLE 7.
Rapid rate at which tee-hoolcg)" is
changing
L.\ck of experience in production
adds to uncertainty and risk.
Lack of low-cost ~ethods for com-
positestrllcture fabrication and
nondestructive testln&.
Personal b... ases
Personalities of decision-oakers
and w11110g0(55 to take risks
Lack of in-service demonstration
as opposed to prediction of per-
formance.
Lack of identifial;le pronuct
champion
Development of system design
requircl:lents
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(Continued)
IntenH'.ticn \o:l.th }\;1nll[acturers' Programs
The rapid evolution of tc,chnolor,y <111oto1y5
provides a s~e~lngly ~ttractive development
on the"horiy.0o of practicality. Conse-
quently, manufilC[Ill::ers tend to be un....11110g
to cur~it to an i~PTovcd, but in:~Tim, tech-
nology IJhf>n they have older technology
available and a more attractive alternative
on the horizon.
The adaptation of existing fabrication
facilities to new technology and the devel-
opment of experimental production lines are
two ~ethods by ~hich manufacturers develop
production knowledge and eA7erience.
}~anufacturers have teams of scientists,
designers, production and m,llntenance
specialists ~ho are developing lo~-cost~
co~petitive bethods for fabrication and ~~r
of advance composite structures.
Manufacturers need to explore new technology
options early in the design and development
program so that the options ~ay be evaluated
before the costs become prohibitive.
Manufacturers need to explore new technology
options early in the design and development
program so that the options may be evaluated
before the costs become prohibitive.
Civil transport manufacturers have coopera-
tive efforts with airlines to demonstrate
ne~ technologies to obtain in-service
experience quickly. Airlines use their
aircraft more intensively th~n any other
operator. HOI-'ever, experiment<3l progr<3r:ls
must n~t je~pa~dize flight OT naintenan~e
schedules or increase the airline's
exposure to risk.
The airframe manufacturers recognize the
role ('Of the product chali'".pion and attempt to
objectively evaluate his ideas.
Manufacturers need to work with the airlines
and reAulatory agencies to develop realistic
system requirements for new technologies,
such as active control technology.
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structural materials, while trying to accumulate in-flight service experience
to demonstr~te the usefulness of advanced composite structures. These
efforts to extend the lifetimes of current airframes will tend to delay intro-
duction of composite technology.
Finally, because the burden of certification is on the manufacturer,
new analytical methods are being investigated which may result in the reduc-
tion of tests required to certify the aircraft. These methods would reduce
the costs and the time rcquired for certification.
Decision Influencers in Commercial
Airframe Development
The decision influencers in the airframe industry and their
relative order of importance are listed in Table 8. As was the case with the
corresponding table for the engine manufacturers (Table 6), the first four
columns at the right indicate the rank order of importance of the decision
influencer at each stage of development. The fifth column presents these
data as trend line to indicate how their influence changes as development
proceeds.
The airlines rank first overall because they are the ultimate
buyers of the new aircraft. The manufacturer directs all of his efforts
toward developing an aircraft that meets the airlines' requirements and
appeals to their preferences.
The Chief of Advanced Design has a strong influence during the
Conceptual and Preliminary Design Stages when options for new technology are
being evaluated. After the preliminary design is completed, his influence
wanes because the design is transferred to the Project Director. During the
Conceptual Design Stage, the Marketing Director and Engineering Director
exert a strong influence on the design. However, in the next two stages,
their influences diverge. The Engineering Director exerts an increasing
influence in the process becRuse critical engineering decisions are being
made, while the Marketing Director's influence declines, only to be restored
when the decision of whetheF to enter into production is reached.
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TABLE 8. RANK ORDER OF IMPORTANCE OF DECISION INFLUENCERS IN
COMMERCIAL AIRFRAME DEVELOPMENT ACROSS ALL DESIGN
AND DEVELOPMENT STAGES
Rank in Design
and Development
Stages
<:: <::
C> C>
'C;; 'C;;
'" '"Cl Cl
...-----,------------------f 7ii ~
Rank Order :::>
( . "'0. .~-All Design
and Develop- <:o~. ~
ment Stages) Decision Influencer (.) 0::
<::
C>
.~
Cl
"~
.~
Cl
<::
o
't
:::>
"~
...
.........
-~_I
-
2 Engineering Director* 3 1 1 4-
1 Airlines 1 3 1 1
3 Chief, Advanced Design* 2 2 5 7
I-----t---
4 En?ine Manufacturers 5 5 1 1
I-----+--~--65---+-_p-ro-j-ec-t-D-ir-e-ct-o-r-*---------+-7-1~6-l-1-+-1.-E:::t./~:+-~
FAA/EPA 6 3 6 10 - __1-----+------------t-+--+---j--t-+-7P;;2"t
7 Marketing Director* 3 8 10 4 .......... / -
8 NASA 8 7 9 12
,
. ,
9 Production Director* 9 9 6 7
9 Chief, Manufacturing Development* 9 9 6 7
t----.,,~---ii-~__1._1__+_E_x_ec_u_t_iv_e-O_f~ic:::er~* -+1...:1-t-.:.11.:..-j_1...:0-t--=-6-J.==¥::::::::r::V---J
12 Legal Directo 12 12 12 14
13 Finance Director* 14 14 14 12
14 Board of Directors* 14 14 14 12
15 Department of Commerce 15 15 15 141-----+-------------1--
16 Department of State 1G 16 16 16
16 Department of Defense 16 16 16 16'-- ...l..-_'-- l--...L.
*Airframe Manuf turer
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The most powerful outside agents influencing the airframe manu-
facturers decision are the engine manufacturers. They rank just below the
airlines and key influencers within the airframe companies during Conceptual
and Preliminary Design and then move up to the first rank with the Project
Director and airlines in the Detail Design Stage and Production Stage.
Next, the Government regulatory agencies and research and develop-
ment agencies exert their influence on the design. The regulations promul-
gated by the FAA with regard to safety, and by EPA with regard to noise and
pollution, require the manufacturers to thoroughly consider these constraints
during Preliminary Design. Also, NASA's strongest influence occurs in thic;
stage because at this time, the manufacturers are evaluating technologies
often made available through NASA-funded resear~h.
The Production Director and Chief of Manufacturing Development
exert a moderate influence during Conceptual and Preliminary Design which
increases as the project moves toward production.
The Executive Officer's influence also increases as the project
approaches the production stage. His decision is based on a multiplicity of
factors, including: (1) the reports of the airlines' reaction to the company
design, (2) the engine manufacturers' promises, and (3) his staff's technical
and marketing evaluations.
It is shown that the Legal Director, Finance Director and Board of
Directors, along with the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense have
only a little influence on the decision to incorporate new technology in a
commercial transport. This is not to imply that they have no influence, it
only suggests that, historically, technical and marketing influences outrank
these six.
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FUTURE DEVELOP}lliNTS IN CIVIL TRANSPORTS
Forecasts of airline activity in the next two decades indicate
that there is a market for over $46 billion worth of new transport air-
craft. Approximately $19 billion is projected for the replacement of
current aircraft. The remainder is required to meet the anticipated world-
wide growth of passenger volume during that time frame. (14) The aircraft
industry is preparing proposals to respond to the airlines' requirements
in the short-term (next 5 years), mid-term (5-10 years), and long-term
(beyond 10 years). This section contains a discussion of some of the antici-
pated engine and airframe developments for future civil transports, and a
description of current NASA research in this area.
Future Engine Requirements
Future engine requirements can be classified into short-term,
mid-term, and long-term needs. Short-term requirements involve modifica-
tions to present in-service engines to improve their competitive position
by reducing ~nscheduled removals, by maintaining performance, etc. Mid-
term engine improvements will apply to the new ten-ton engines now undergoing
development. Long-term advancements would be applicable to the next genera-
tion of engines (beyond the ten-ton engines) which could be available
around 1990.
In the short term, a key to implementing technological advances is
competitive pressure. This is especially true in the current high-bypass-
ratio turbofan competition. To maintain CF6 performance guarantees, GE is
investigating two causes of engine efficiency degradation: dirty compressors
and turbine-blade rubbing. (15) However, GEts main short-term attention has
been on solving bird ingestion problems. P&WA has also experienced blade
rubbing problems on the JT9D, but within the compressor and not the turbine.
An expensive refurbishment program is now underway which involves replace-
ment of the blade tip rubbinb strips, reprofiling and replacing some blades.
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P&WA's JT8D has been in the enviable position of having essen-
tially no competition. As a result, P&WA has been reluctant to invest its
own funds in technology improvement programs for these engines. However,
a program has been launched recently to develop a new family of JT8D engines,
designated the -200 series. These engines capitalize on the technology
developed in the NASA JT8D Refan Program to provide significant reductions
in aircraft noise, while also offering increased thrust and reduced specific
fuel consumption.
The new aircraft engines for the 1980s will be the CFM56 and JT10D
ten-ton engines. Scheduled for certification within the next few years, these
engines have been designed for fuel efficiency, airline economics, and environ-
mental compatibility. The incorporation of advanced design philosophy and
technological features results in a cruise fuel consumption improvement of 20
percent relative to present turbofans in the same thrust class. Improvements
in aerodynamic and structural technology have permitted the use of fan blades
with lower aspect ratio and wider chords. Inexpensive fiberglass - epoxy
composite materials are being used in low temperature non-structural applica-
tions (e.g., fan exhaust struts). Turbines are making use of better materials
and improved cooling systems.
In the long term, the engine companies are also concentrating their
efforts on reducing fuel consumption, engine price, and maintenance costs.
Engine companies are especially senSitive to maintenance problems because of
loss of the "good will" with the air1im.s as a result of schedule delay, lost
seats, etc. Improvements in these areas must be balanced against environ-
mental acceptability. Starting at the front of the engine, 3-4 percent
improvements in fan efficiency are expected in the next generation engines.
This will result mainly from advanced technology fan blades which will have
wider chords, improved airfoil shape, and a single damper shroud. Compressor
efficiency is also expected to increase by several percent through better
choice of design point and operating line. Perhaps the surest way to reduce
cost is to improve turbine durability. New materials providing higher
strength at temperature and permitting advanced film cooling techniques are
needed. POSSibly the single most important dimension in a high temperature
turbine affecting its performance is the clearance between the blade and the
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turbine case seal. By using a ceramic seal surface to reduce seal cooling
air requirements, a 1~1/2 percent reduction in specific fuel consumption
may be possible. Another major component which impacts costs is the fuel
control. With the number of control functions now required, the more pre-
cise fuel scheduling provided by a digital computer will reduce fuel
consumption. By measuring and limiting turbine metal temperature directly,
parts replacement and maintenance costs will be reduced. By combining all
of these component improvements with a bypass ratio of 8 to 12 and an over-
all pressure ratio of 40-50, potential fuel consumption improvement of up
to 20 percent may be achieved. However, practical limitations exist.
Higher pressure ratios requiLe more costly materials and higher turbine
temperatures; the leakage and clearance problems may prove unsolvable.
Future Airframe Technology Requirements
The aircraft industry has divided the projected near- to mid-term
market for future aircraft into three broad categories: (1) 100/120 passen-
ger short-range aircraft; (2) a 140/160 passenger short- to mid-range aircraft;
and (3) a 200/220 passenger mid- to long-range aircraft. For the long-term,
they anticipate a replacement for the current wide-body (250/400 seat) air-
craft by the early 1990's.
Several aircraft have been proposed to meet the near- to mid-term
requirements. }lcDonnell-Douglas has proposed a derivative of its DG_9(16) ,
while Fokker has proposed an extensively modified version of its F-28 series
aircraft to meet the need for a 100/120 passenger aircraft(17,18). For the
140/160 passenger aircraft, Boeing has proposed the 7N7, the Daussalt-
McDonnell combine has proposed the Mercure 200, and British Aircraft proposed
a derivative of the BAG-Ill. (19)
For the 200 passenger aircraft, the aircraft which has created the
most interest for near- to mid-term development, there are several proposed
aircraft including the Boeing 7X7(20), the Douglas DG_X_200(21,22), and the
Airbus 300-BIO(19).
In responding to the near-term, the manufacturers are offering
essentially existing aircraft with engines modified to meet FAR36 noise
standards and to improve fuel consumption slightly.
may be possible to achieve a 40
The aircraft industry is studying
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For the mid-term, the serious contenders have been developing the
following technologies to provide a 15 to 20 percent improvement in fuel
efficiency. This list includes, in addition to high-bypass ratio engines
i h d f 1 . d d d . (14,17,22)w t improve ue consumpt10n an re uce n01se:
• Supercritical wing technology
- thicker wings
- higher aspect ratios
- less sweep back
• High-lift devices
- leading edge and trailing edge flaps
• Improved conventional structural materials
and assembly methods
• Composite materials (graphite reinforced) for
secondary structure and easily replaceable items
such as elevators, rudders, ailerons, fairings,
doors, airbrakes, leading and trailing edges and
tips of wings.*
• Digital electronics for navigation and all-weather
landing, and reduced cockpit complexity.
For the long-term (post 1985), it
percent improvement in fuel efficiency. (14)
technologies such as:
• Improved wing aerodynamic design processes,
including wing-body blending and wing-engine
integration.
• Laminar flow control to reduce drag
• Improved air traffic control such as 4-D naviga-
tion control, that is, positive control of time
of arrival as well as altitude, spacing, and
airspeed.
• Advance metallic and composite structures,
including composite primary structures such
as the wing torque box and fuselage components.
• Active controls to enhance airplane efficiency
through augmentation and control systems.
* Some of the technical considerations for introducing advanced composites
into civil transport airframes are discussed in Appendix B.
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NAS.·'" s Aircraft Energy Efficiency Program
Propulsion System Technology
Within the NASA Aircraft Energy Efficiency Program, there are two
major programs dealing with Propulsion System Technology. The Engine Com-
ponent Improvement Program is directed at near-term improvements that can
be incorporated into current engines to reduce fuel consumption. The
Energy Efficient Engine Program is a longer-range effort to demonstrate
technology for the next generation, more fuel-efficient, turbofan engine.
The Engin,. Component Improvement Program has two basic parts:
Engine Diagnostics and Performance Improvement. The purpose of the Engine
Diagnostics activity is to develop methods to reduce the deterioration in
performance .that occurs over the life of an engine. The Performance Improve-
ment portion of this program is aimed at developing components which would
reduce the fuel consumption of current U. S. commercial engines and be ready
for introduction into new production versions of these engines in the 1980 -
1982 time period. (23)
Current NN A plans are directed at improved turbine cooling,blading
seals and clearance control, exhaust nozzle mixers and digital electronic
controls. These improvements are anticipated to be available for JT8D's,
JT9D's, and CF6's in the 1980 - 1982 time period. The project schedule has
been constructed so as to be compatible with standard engine development
procedures.
The Energy Efficient Engine program will provide the technology
base for significant reductions in fuel consumption for all new turbofan
engines. Engine requirements will include a more efficient cycle, improved
aerodynamic performance, better seals, reduced clearances, and higher-
temperature materials. Current technology cannot provide these fuel-saving
improvements and technology advances must be pursued in every component of
the engine. (24) The NASA Task Force recommended $175 million for the Energy
Efficient Engine program over an eleven year period, in a schedule that appears
to be consistent with a 1990 date of entry.
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Airframe Technology
The NASA Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACEE) program has two pro-
grams aimed at improvements in aircraft configurations. In the Energy
Efficient Transport program, efforts are placed on the development of
advanced aerodynamics and active controls for near-term application to
derivative or n~' transports. Areas being studied are: high aspect
ratio wings incorporating supercritical airfoil sections, winglets, ad-
vanced high-lift devices, integrated airframe-propulsion systems, and
active controls. The second aerodynamic program is Laminar Flow Control
(LFC). It is aimed at achieving low-drag laminar flow control systems for
transport aircraft. This program includes engineering investigations,
analyses, design studies, and component tests necessary to evaluate al-
ternative LFC design concepts. (23)
The remaining element of ~he ACEE program is the Composites
Primary Aircraft Structures program. The objective of this program is to
provide the technology for reducing air transport fuel consumption by the
use of composite materials to reduce the weight of new aircraft. The program
includes the design, development, certification and flight service of secon-
dary structures, moderate size primary structures, and a wing. The program
is designed to permit increasing experience with these new materials and
processes leading to the development of large primary structures. (23)
The NASA Task Force recommended additional funding of $50 million
over 6 years for the Energy Efficient Transport program; $100 million for the
Laminar Flow Control program over the next 10 years; and $110 million during
the next 6 years for the Composites Primary Structures program. These pro-
grams should provide an improved technology base for aircraft being developed
for the 1990's.
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CONCLUSIONS
In this study, the process by which both jet and airframe manu-
facturers decide to invest in new technology has been examined. An analysis
methodology was developed and applied to identify the rank ordering of
importance of barriers to innovation in both the engine and airframe industries
as well as the importance of various decision influencers at each stage of
development. Comparison of the barriers in the n.o industries leads to the
conclusions that:
(1) Decisions to introduce new technology in jet engine
development are heavily influenced by considerations
(a) Life-cycle cost competitiveness of the design
(b) Past experience with new technology and a
generally conservative attitude toward product
development
(c) Uncertainties in development time caused by new
technology.
(2) Due to the larger production runs of engines versus air-
frames, nonrecurring development costs can be more
easily amortized in engine production and are consequently
of less concern. This fact may, in part, motivate the
long and thorough development process that engine manu-
facturers undertake to ensure a satisfactory end product.
(3) The airframe manufacturers design and development
decisions are heavily influenced by
(a) The need to meet performance and service
guarantees
(b) The need to control nonrecurring costs in the
airframe development process because of their
limited ability to amortize these costs across
large production runs.
(c) The possibility of recurring costs associated
with uncertainties about manufacturing and main-
tenance costs.
In both the jet engine and airframe industries, remarkable actions
have been taken and programs have been instituted to prevent these barriers
to innovation from bringing technical stagnation to the industry. It is to
their managers' credit that they have been willing to literally risk their
future on billion-dollar aircraft and engine developments, while at the s"me
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time advancing the technical state of the art through the introduction of new
technology.
This type of business management performance results from a complex
set of interactions among decision influencers in the two industries. The
complementary interactions of airframe and engine manufacturers with each
other and with the airlines has enabled the commercial air industry as a
whole to produce and operate increasingly productive aircraft.
There are significant differences in the way that decisions are
made in the development of engines and airframes. The engine manufacturers
tend to be influenced more by dominant personalities than do the airframe
manufacturers, but are also more dependent on long-range planning due to the
exceptionally long engine development process. The airframe manufacturers,
with their short development cycle, must respond to the airline market and
when that market results in the definition of a new aircraft, depend heavily
on the design and development decisions of their technical managers.
'{hen planning Government support of technical development, it is
significant to note that NASA and FAA/EPA have a strong and continuing
influence in all three design stages leading to airframe production. In con-
trast to this, during jet engine development, DOD and NASA are the second
most important decision influencers in the Exploratory Development Stage.
They must essentially "hit" this window in the development cycle with their
technical contributions because their influence drops off sharply after this
stage.
The next generation of civil transport aircraft and engines may
well be developed under international consortium agreements. Under such
arrangements, Pratt & IVhitney Aircraft and General Electric, the two fore-
most aircraft engine companies in the world, will want to maintain primary
control over the engine development by being responsible for the engine core.
Therefore, for NASA to be most responsive to U.S. needs, they should con-
centrate long-term research efforts on core-related technologies. In the
realm of airframe technology, the U.S. has a superior position in the management
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and application of manufacturing technology. This talent coupled with
supportive programs to develop advanced aerodynamic concepts, active control
systems, and new materials for aircraft structures, will allow the U.s. to
maintain 'that position.
Individuals with a variety of technical, financial, and legal back-
grounds participate in a complex set of interactions to reach design and
development decisions for n~, civil transport aircraft. In this report, the
technical barriers to the introduction of new technology have been defined
and a technique developed and applied for evaluating their relative importance
at each stage in the aircraft development process. A decision framework and
the parties involved in the decision processes required for the introduction
of new technology have been identified and examined to determine both their
relative overall influence and how that influence enters into decisions at
each stage of the aircraft and engine development processes. In any partic-
ular development program, the detailed interactions among groups and individuals
in the manufacturers' organizations, as well as with the airlines and regulatory
agencies, occurs in a complex and unique manner as dictated by the needs of the
program. This report provides an improved understanding of the barriers to
innovation and of the roles that key individuals play in determining the tech-
nology for new aircraft. It is a first step toward understanding the decision-
making process by which new technology is incorporated in civil air transport.
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APPENDIX A
STRUCTURED DATA AND ANALYSES
Subsequent to interviews with the two major U.S. commercial jet
engine and three commercial airframe manufacturers, the interviewers were
asked to fill out the sets of matrices shown in Figures A-I and A-2. They
were requested to fill in only important interactions. The relative
sparsity of the engine matrix compared to the airframe matrix primarily
reflects a difference in the threshold levels of what is or is not considered
to be important by the two independent groups of interviewers. This, how-
ever, does not affect the results of the analysis since engines and airframes
are analyzed independently. A "1" entered in a cell of the matrix indicates
that an important interaction occurs between the two factors that intersect
to form that cell. Similarly, an "0" indicates that a less critical or no
interaction occurs.
As mentioned in the main body of the report, the interviewers were
asked to produce composite views of the three airframe and two engine manu-
facturers when filling out the respective airframe and engine matrices.
Thus, Figure A-I represents their perception of the important interactions
affecting the introduction of new technology in commerciAl jet engines by
Pratt & Whitney and General Electric. Similarly, Figure A-2 represents the
Boeing, Lockheed and Douglas composite view of the interactions among
factors involved with the introduction of new technology in commercial airframes.
This method of documentation has certain drawbacks--not the least
of which is the fatigue that sets in after several hours of filling out
matrices--but it does force the interviewers to rigorously consider and make
a judgment about each interaction in the complex decision process involved in
the design and development of new engines and airframes. It also facilitates
recording the interactions that the interviewers are most confident of and,
through subsequent analyses, deriving the other interactions.
A-2
Figures A-I and A-2 were designed to allow the interviewers to
document interactions between Barriers to Innovation and Decision Influencers,
between Decision Influencers and Design Criteria, and between Design Criteria
and Design and Development Stages. Appropriate matrix multiplication resulted
in the matrices sho\<n in Figures A-3 through A-6, which indicate the inter-
actions between
• Decision Influencers and Commercial Jet Engine Design
and Development Stages
• Decision Influencers and Commercial Air Transport
Design and Development Stages
• Barriers to Innovation and Commercial Jet Engine
Design and Development Stages
• Barriers to Innovation and Commercial Air Trap port
Design and Development Stages,
respectively.
The matrix entries reflect the relative levels of interaction and
can be summed to rank order:
(1) The relative importance of Decision Influencers
within each Design Stage.
(2) The relative importance of Barriers to Innovation
within each Design Stage.
Thes5 scores and corresponding rank orders are shown in the
columns adjacent to the matrices. ~-lso shown are the scores summed across
all Design and Development Stages and the overall rank order of the Decision
Influencers and Barriers to Innovation.
A word of caution is in order regarding the interpretation of
results obtained through this type of analysis. Because the results are
quantified and highly structured, there is a tendency to assign more credi-
bility to the specific rankings than is warranted.
Due to the somewhat subjective basis for the rank orders, the pre-
cision is not great and a difference of item places in rank order should not
be considered significant. Major differences in rank order (i.e., more than
5 to 10 positions in rank) are probably significant. It is On this order of
comparison that the results will be evaluated and conclusions drawn.
A-3
It is also noted that, while the rank ordering is generated wjth
the most significant Barriers to Innovation given the highest rank (lowest
cardinal number), a view from the other end of the barriers list provides
considerable insight into the manufacturer's decision-making process. Many
factors that are often considered to be barriers to innovation in other
industries have apparently been overcome by the commercial airframe and jet
engine manufacturers.
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Brief Historical Perspective
The first application of composite materials to aircraft primary
structures in the United States, was the fuselage of the Vultee BT-15.
This was a single-engined, low-wing monoplane designed, fabricated, and
tested in the laboratory by the U.S.A.A.F. in 1943. The first flight
was in March, 1944. On a strength-to-weight basis, the fuselage which
was in sandwich construction with glass-reinforced plastic (GRP) skins
and an end-grain balsa core, showed a 50 percent improvement over the
conventional aluminum structure. Around the same time, the U.S.A.A.F.
designed and fabricated a "ing for the North American AT-6, also a single-
engined, low-wing monoplane. This structure was also of sandwich design,
but the GRP skins were stabilized by a cellular, cellulose-acetate core.
While both composite structures demonstrated a significant improvement
in static strength over aluminum structures, the designs did not enter
production. The principal problems which hindered the production go-
ahead of these structures, were, briefly, as follows:
• Lack of automated fabrication methods to produce
reliable structures (hand-layup was used)
• Limited knowledge on the effects-of-defects and,
hence, there was little basis for confidence in
the design
• The cost-estimates were questionable and, hence,
doubts existed on projected cost-competitiveness.
There are further examples where attempts to employ composites
in production primary airframe structures failed for these and similar
reasons. However, the use of GRP for radomes was most successful where
the unique electrical characteristics could be utilized.
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International Considerations
An important consideration when evaluating and justifying
composite materials for civil aircraft primary structure applications
is the bilateral and multilateral consortiums which are being established
between U.S. and foreign manufacturers. With the exception of possibly
rotor-blade fabrication, the United States is, at least, 4 years ahead
of most Western countries with primary composite structure applications
in both military and civil aircraft and, neither the design capabilities
nor the manufacturing facilities for advanced composites are available
in the foreign countries to produce large primary structures for civil
transport or military aircraft. The technology being developed under
NASA and DOD sponsorship is important since it should provide the United
States with a more commanding position and, therefore, leverage when
negotiating future international agreelnents. These agreements usually
require major components and/or subassemblies to be fabricated in the
countries where head offices of potential airline customers are located.
The composite technology under development will enable the United States
to compete favorably, and it is likely that the composite structures
will have to be produced in this country. Due to the projected growth
of composites where over 2.5 million flight hours will have been logged
by composite components by 1982(1) and the projected 26 percent weight
savings withcomposite-wings(2), this competitive edge is important.
Design Staff Limitations
The relatively small, but effective, design teams established
to develop experimental aircraft structures will need to be considerably
expanded when a commitment is made to introduce composite structures
into series production. lfuen one considers a major program with tight
schedules required to meet market opportunities, over 2,000 engineers
are needed to release the drawings on a typical aircraft and then 800
engineers might be retained throughout the duration of the program to
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incorporate modifications which are constantly introduced. It would appear
that implications of building larger staffs, experienced in composites,
should be recognized already at this time. Aerospace companies are
capable of retraining engineers on-site and several have impressive
in-house educational programs.
In all aerospace companies, experienced designers recruited
during Horld Har II and in the early 1950's, are now retiring. This
represents a loss of extensive experience. Because of the problem of the
high average age of design staffs, there is a need to hire and train
new generations of designers in the next 5 to 10 years. Recently NASA
awarded a grant to Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute to establish a
center for the study of composite material applications to energy efficient
aircraft. This is a timely and important step which will help to reduce
the effect of the above problems.
The technology transfer process can be simplified by having
key composite engineers "walk" with the aircraft development, i. e.,
from the conceptual through detail design stages. Furthermore, to
achieve low-cost designs, the designers must become involved in the shops
to help identify high-cost areas in manufacturing and assembly and to
assist in developing solutions involving manufacturing technologies.
This is an important interface.
Recent Important Developments in Structures
Technology for Military Aircraft
The use of advanced composites for the Navy F-14, the Air
Force F-15 horizontal stabilizers in production, and similar parts for
the F-16 have been well documented. The results of this impressive
service experience with the F-14 and F-15 and the confidence thus being
acquired, are now being applied in major components for the Rockwell
International B-1. Besides offering cost savings and considerable weight
savings, other advantages of employing advanced composite materials for
the F-14, F-15, and F-16 stabilizers should be mentioned. Composites
are built up-to-shape, rather than being machined down-to-shape, as is
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frequently the case with metals resulting in low-utilization factors(3) .
Furthermore, long lead-times are required for the dies of large forgings
and the machining operation itself is expensive. Composites should
enable lead-times to be reduced circumventing some traditional production
problems and will provide the designer with more time to, for example,
conduct manufacturing cost/design trades, and with greater flexibility
in the development process. The military experience is, of course,
important for civil aircraft composite acceptance.
During a visit to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company,
it was stated that structural developments on the Air Force YC-14 STOL
transport will result in technologicals spinoff for their future civil
transport designs. Two specific examples were mentioned; the electronic
cockpit displays and the bonded honeycomb sandwich construction used
for the horizontal and vertical stabili,zers. The sand"dch structural
configuration is frequently employed for composites. The YC-14 structure
is an important development of advanced primary structures, as adhesive-
bonding is extensively used. Adhesive-bonding is, of cOurse, sometimes
employed between metallic and composite components, besides for joining
the composite elements themselves. Boeing has acquired extensive ex-
perience in the application of adhesive-bonded honeycomb and also low-
cost GRP composites in secondary structures on all 707 civil aircraft and
military versions of this aircraft. The selection of bonding for the
YC-14 was a projection of this experience. In several instances on
the YC-14, lower cost design approaches were used to alleviate the problem
of traditional cost drivers. Machining of the honeycomb core was minimized
and simple, but efficient, edge-member designs were developed. However,
Boeing is anticipating some problems with the Air Force Logistics
Command (AFLC) because of limited experience in repairing sand"ich
primary structures.
The primary adhesive-bonded structure (PABST) under development
at McDonnell-Douglas Corporation is a further example of potential spin-
off from military aircraft to civil transports. The objectives of this
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fuselage program sponsored by U.S.A.F. are to save 20 percent in manu-
facturing cost and 20 percent in life-cycle cost, which implies
increased inspection intervals and/or reduced repair costs. These
objectives provide a further indication of the importance of ,iesign-to-
cost prevailing in all programs.
Primary Structures - Some Economic Considerations
The limited service experience with civil transport primary
structures must be supported by extensive laboratory tests and analytical
modeling of the effect of defects, derived during fabrication and in
service, to enable the data to be transferred from one structure to
another type. \;hile the introduction of composites should not influence
flight-test time, all companies visited by the project team expressed
concern about the excessive cost per hour of flight-testing. This cost
is approximately $30,000 per hour and a total of 1,000 hours are probably
required for the four aircraft that are normally flight tested. This
cost represents flight-time only. Furthermore, a large group of engineers
is also required to analyze the data. The economic and other resources
needed for this phase of civil transport development must serve as a
drain on those funds required to transfer or commit new materials,
manufacturing and other technologies into series production aircraft.
A further factor to consider with the development of composite
structures for civil transports is the implication of airline cost of
ownership and operation as they apply to guarantees and the losses
which an airframe manufacturer might incur.
Consideration of the airline maintenance requirements and repair
procedures for composite materials must be included at the design phase,
as airline labor maintenance costs are increasing and productivity is
decreasing. Hence, airlines will be concerned even more than in the past
about the cost of maintenance for both provisional and major repairs.
Furthernlore, airline maintenance departments seem to be reducing in size, yet
the st~jf which is available must be trained to repair these new materials
B-6
and structures which have different configurations and joints than metallic
assemblies. New techniques for inspection and repair are necessary which
require further investments by the airlines and should also be developed
with cost in mind. Design for insensitivity of the structure to material
and fabrication deficiencies must also receive consideration in the overall
effort by design-manufacturing teams to reduce cost.
The cost of composite structures are frequently compared with
metallic structures already in production. In this case, the metallic
components have usually arrived at an advanced point on the learning curve
and the costs of the two types of structure may, therefore, never
intersect. Because of this advantage, structure in production might always
be of lower cost. When substituting composite materials for metallic
hardware in production, composite structures can be in an unfavorable
position when the final decisions are being made by management in con-
sultation with the airlines. On the other hand, advanced composites
represent a new technology for civil aircraft and will therefore attract
considerable attention. This could result in a steeper learning curve.
The higher cost of the composite material will result in a significant
effort to compensate for this by reducing the part-count, quality control
costs, and hence, manufacturing and assembly manhours for demonstration
hardware. Because of these potential cost problems, candidate structures
for demonstrating composites must be selected with considerable care.
A major problem with organic composites is the difficulty in
optimized primary structural configurations to provide an alternative
metallic structure or backup technology which will meet the form,
fit, and function requirements of the composite should a major
economic or technical problem occur. Joints in composite
structures, for example, are different than for other materials. Should
such a drastic change be necessary, slippage of the civil transport
delivery schedules will unfavorably influence the market opportunities.
This can be a difficult financial problem for both the airframe manufacturer
and the airline customer.
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Primary structures of civil transport aircraft require a
10- or l2-year warranty. The annual utilization and life expectancies
of civil and military aircraft are shown in Table B-1. With regard to
warranties, a wing-box or a horizontal stabilizer-box represent different
problems than flaps or other control surfaces which can be easily seg-
mented, providing redundancy, and replaced. Current civil transport
wings and stabilizer panels are relatively low-cost structures. The
airlines may not readily accept an aircraft "dth a unique major structure
without significant cost savings and appropriate warranties which are
already a major burden for the aircraft manufacturer. The Government
should, therefore, continue their support of programs designed to accelerate
technology transfer, but it must be kept in mind that the extensive
application of new technologies, for example, composite materials, will
be cautiously considered by the manufa~turers for reasons such as the
service-warranty risks involved. Consequently the application of tech-
nologies whose development is supported by Government funding may be
delayed in spite of the success being demonstrated in the current programs.
TABLE B-l, ADVANCED CO~ITOSITE APPLICATIONS, Ah~UAL USAGE AND
LIFE EXPECTANCIES OF SELECTED AIRCRAFT
r==o
[Aircraft Advanced Weight per Annual Usage, Life Expectancy,
Type Composite Ship-Set Hours Hours
-'
F-14* Boron/Epoxy 185 350 4,000
F-15** Boron/Epoxy & 210 350 4,000
Graphite/Epoxy 100
707-300C -
-
3,500 30,000
747-100
- -
3,500 60,000
I
'==
, , .
_.-
. = ~~
*F-14 employs advanced composites in empennage.
**F-15 employs advanced composites in empennage and speed brake.
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Fabrication Technology - A j,eak Link Due to Cost?
While minimized life-cycle costs have always been of importance
to the airframe manufacturers and the airlines, in the future, increased
emphasis can also be expected to reduce acquisition cost due to the in-
vestment alternatives that are available for capital. It is, therefore,
necessary to continue to further develop strong materials/manufacturing/
design interfaces from the outset of all programs to reduce these costs
while achieving acceptable or affordable structural performance. Equipment
is needed to fabricate, inspect, and assemble the structures at lO~ver
costs. Also, innovative design concepts must be evolved for ease of
fabrication and ease of nondestructive evaluation. It is likely, that
today a composite fin, using state-of-the-art design and fabrication
techniques, "auld cost more than a .production fin in aluminum alloy. For
example, an aluminum fin for a wide-bodied jet probably costs between
$50,000 and $60,000. However, the cost-saving possibilities of graphite-
cloth versus the tape form are important in this regard. The selection of
cloth, tape, epoxies, or thermoplastics will, of course, depend on the
structural part being designed. A potential problem with composite
tape-laying equipment is that companies producing such equipment are
experiencing financial problems. This factor needs consideration, for
example, by stimulating commercial uses of the facilities.
As the airline: are emphasizing, firstly, economics; secondly,
energy; and thirdly, environment, the designers must generate lower cost
structures with regard to both acquisition cost and the cost of operation.
Economy is the main objective.
Summarizing, energy efficient civil aircraft require not only the
the development of composite structures, but also the specialized equipment
required for their fabrication and nondestructive evaluation.
B-9
Secondary Structures - A Logical Opportunity for Composites
Secondary structures seem to offer an important opportunity
for composite materials, in particular graphite-reinforced thermoplastic
sheets and chopped fibers and also, novel fabrication techniques such
as braiding, molding, pultrusion, and weaving. Secondary structures are
frequently cost-drivers in aircraft construction. As briefly mentioned
earlier, some major components of primary structures such as the wing
slabs, are the 10'iV'est cost form of construction, e.g., the formed, primed,
and machined skins for wide-body jets may cost as low as $8.00 per pound
prior to assembly. The lowest cost per pound is frequently achieved
with structures subjected to the greatest loads such as the landing gear
and wing panels. This is due to the higher working stress levels and lower
part count(4). Furthermore, the weight of secondary structures is
frequently almost identical to those of assembled primary structures and
is shown in Table A-2. This table was compiled hom discussions at the
Lockheed-California Company, Burbank, California.
Graphite-reinforced thermoplastics (G/Tp) available in the form
of sheet materials can be stored in a similar way to metal sheets and
are suited to high-volume forming processes. G/Tp is being studied by the
Boeing Company for clips, fittings, and ribs. Because of the advantages of
graphite/thermoplastics, they are expected also to make important in-
roads in consumer products, such as in automobiles. Commercial applications
are not only important with regard to potential reduction of material
costs attributed to increasing the volume of materials produced, but also
because the fabrication processes developed for consumer products are
expected to be applicable, in certain cases, to the aerospace industry.
The designer may find it desirable to develop families of standard
brackets, riblets, etc, for secondary structures that lend themselves
to the utilization of these ne", fabrication processes and, hence, reduce
cost.
A further point concerning the use of composites for secondary
structures is that the glas~~reinforced pre impregnated plastics already
extensively used for fairings, control surfaces, etc, can be conveniently
B-IO
TABLE B-2. APPROXIHATE PERCENTAGE HEIGHT DISTRIBUTIONS
OF PRIHARY AND SECONDARY STRUCTURES IN A
HIDE-BODY CIVIL AIRCRAFT.*
Najor Sub-Assenbly
Structure Category
Fuselage \-ling Empennage
Primary 70% 50% 50%
Secondary 30% 50% 50%
-
* Table prepared from discussions at the Lockheed-California
Company.
rJ
(J
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selectively reinforced or "spiked" using grids of graphite-fibers in the
weave for application in, for example, critical joining areas. While
graphite-fibers "ill never be as inexpensive as glass-fibers, the selective
reinforcement of these laminates, where a minimum gage problem does not
exist, may enable thinner laminates to be used. In commercial products,
reductions in layup time have compensated for the higher cost of the
graphite fibers, besides providing the required structural strength,
stiffness, and fracture tolerance. Introducing graphite fibers in com-
ponents already extensively employing glass-fiber reinforced plastics
(GRP) is important, as the airlines will begin to acquire experience with
this new material i.n a form familiar to them. Most airlines have
engineers and technicians experienced with low-cost GRP. The Boeing-747,
today, utilizes over 12,000 square feet of GRP which has been accepted
and successfully maintained by the airlines for several years. The
incorporation of the graphite-fiber grid "ill not increase maintenance
costs for the airlines, on the other hand, these requirements should be
reduced.
An unpredictable yet major cost for the airlines with secondary
structures is the problem of corrosion control and repair in cargo holds,
galleys, and lavatories. Composite materials will minir.lize corrosion
problems, besides reducing the weight and acquisition costs mentioned
earlier. These, then, are a number of important reasons why secondary
structural applications of advanced composites should continue to be
pursued and possibly even expanded by NASA.
The Design-to-Lowest Cost Problem
It was evident during the visits to the civil aircraft companies,
that the challenge of designing to lowest cost are expected to become
increasingly severe due to the grol'ing problems of inflation, systems
sophistication, fuel costs, labor costs, and other business opportunities
competing for available funds. It is therefore necessary that the benefits
of new technologies be justified not only by performance improvements, for
example, by providing new aerodynamic configurations made possible by
B-12
these materials and processes, but also by alleviating these problems of
designing to lowest cost. The design teams at the commercial airplane
c~mFanies are being motivated into a design-to-cost attitude by providing(S)
• Incentive-cost targets against which personnel
performance can be measured
• Tools - documentation of costs and cost reduction
methods.
The aircraft design team priorities are sho\m in Figure B-1,
and in Figure B-2, the interaction is shown between manufacturing costs of
all types of structures and design objectives, "hich includes life-
cycle costs. These figures were provided by the Boeing Commercial
Airplane Company; a member of the Battelle/airframe industry team preparing
Reference 5.
It is evident that the designers must consider cost as a design
parameter and a design discipline along with weight and performance,
Figure 3(6). Every decision requires a thorough understanding of all
costs involved but to meet the requirements of the design to lowest cost
approach, the personnel on each program will be dedicated to reducing
costs. It is necessary to provide detailed information on all aspects
of the cost of composite materials to designers. The data must be
presented in a manner familiar to him so he can use it rapidly and develop
confidence in it as with metals. Design information of this type is
being developed for metallic materials(S). The designer will be expected
to understand all costs Centers and must conduct various cost trades
between metallic and composite materials when making selections of
materials, manufacturing technologies, and developing lowest-cost con-
figurations.
It is essential that management and the designers be provided
with cost information on all aspects of composite material development
in the following areas:
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• Material property generation
• Fundament~l material fabrication processes
• Component fabrication methods
• Methods of analysjs
• Joining and assembly technologies
• Nondestructive evaluation (NDE)
• Serviceability and repair, etc.
All programs on composite material structure development for
commercial airframes must include cost studies on the various aspects
of composite desig~, fabrication, assembly, and serviceability in addition
to the traditional studies on structural performance, damage tolerance,
etc.
The variation of the cost reduction leverage with time for
airframe designers at various points in the design process is indicated
in Figure B-4. It is seen that the opportunities to reduce cost and improve
the structural performance varies drastically throughout the design/production
cycle. The maximum leverage occurs during the preliminary design stage
and declines to almost nil in advanced stages of production.
Historically, designing to lower cost has taken a back seat
to other requirements in the design of airframe structures. Structural
integrity, durability, etc, always took precedance over cost. Too often
cost trades were only conducted when the drawing release schedules permitted.
Cost trades are frequently accomplished by design producibility
and cost estimating staffs. Because of the large ratio of designers to
cost analysts, the number of trades which can be exercised during the
initial design phase prior to drawing release exceeds the capacity of
the cost analysis staff. In the future the designer, equipped ,,,ith
computerized cost information presented in acceptable formats, will
conduct trade-off studies himself and will further be stimulated to
develop innovative structural design concepts to reduce cost.
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Problems Hhen Replacing Het.als \,ith Composites
The importance of the problem of designing to 10l,er cost cannot
be over stressed and the follOl,ing example serves to illustrate the
problem which can occur when replacing a conventional design with
a new material even when weight and cost advantages are achieved.
Performance/cost-trade studies to reduce both weight and cost
of airframes \.;ere conducted in the program on "Manufacturing Methods for
Metal-Hatrix Structural Components", conducted by General Dynamics,
Convair Division, and Rockwell International(7). The AF}~ program set
out to unify the results of recent advances with the boron/aluminum,
metal-matrix, composite material used for the NASA Space-Shuttle fuselage
truss system, and ~anufacturing methods. It also set out to demonstrate
the near term cost and weight savings of boron/aluminum for major air-
craft programs such as the U.S.A.F. B-1.
Five components from the B-1 were examined to assess the potential
application of boron/aluminum as a replacement for the baseline structure.
The following components were studied by the General Dynamics/Rockwell
International team:
• Aft fuselage stub frame
• Nacelle support beam in aft intermediate fuselage
• Stringer in wing carry-through structure
• Outboard closure rib of wing carry-through structure
• Wing root structure rib.
Ifben this study was initiated the baseline configuration was,
with the ex "ption of the nacelle beam, machined and diffusion-bonded
titanium. The nacelle beam was a machined titanium forging.
The results of this study, 1;hich included the fabrication and
test of the wing rib panel, are summarized in Tables B-3 and B-4, shol-'ing
the weight and cost values, respectively(7)
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During the evolution of all engineering systems in the increasingly
cost-conscience environment, iterations are constantly under way with
the materials and processes being used in production. Improvements can
occur with the baseline structure with ~vhich all alternative approaches
are compared and, also, the aircraft operating environment becomes more
accurately defined, frequently alleviating the thermal and other conditions.
The latter is believed to have been the case in the development wing-
rib panel for the B-1. In spite of the favorable weight and cost payoffs
shown in Tables B-3 and B-4, the comparison was made with the haseline
structure and design objectives at the point of initiation of the com-
posites program and it was not possible to substitute later the metal-
matrix composite and process technologies for the production component.
The question of more accurately defining the vehicle operating
environment seems to be unavoidable. However, progress with conventional
and advanced metallic materials and processes must also be appreciated
and considered when planning and carrying out programs involving advanced
composite materials. It is therefore now considered appropriate to
address this emerging problem of future competition between the metal
and composite technologies.
While promising advanced composite materials are being evaluated
in NASA and Defense flight-service programs, advanced metallic structural
development programs are also underway. New configurations and manu-
facturing processes are expected to improve the efficiency of structures
utilizing conventional materials. These structures will also be categorized
as "advanced". The increased usage of adhesives, weld-bonding and rivet-
bonding, will, for example, enhance the opportunities for designers to
develop fresh approaches to reduce acquisition and life-cycle costs.
It is appropriate to summarize the objectives of current advanced metallic
programs. The goals of this parallel effort to composites, are as follows:
• Acquisition Cost Reduction - Achieve a 20-30 percent reduction
in the cost of metallic airframes
B-22
• Cost of Ownership Reduction
• Improved Structural Integrity -
• Extended Performance
Achieve a 15-20 percent
reduction in funds expended
in maintenance of metallic
airframes
Provide the approaches
whereby new requirements
in the areas of safety,
durability, and life
management can be imple-
mented with no increase in
cost
Assure availability of the
metals technology required
for future high performance
aircraft.
The following is a brief summary indicating the efforts underway
to achieve the above objectives:
• Simplified design configurations
• Manufacturing innovation, e.g., computer-aided
forming methods
• Elimination or reduction of fasteners
• Reduce part-count through unitized structures,
castings, etc.
• Reduction of machining improving material
utilization factors
• Reduction of tooling and assembly costs, e.g.,
through weld-bonding
• Increased use of adhesive-bonding for primary
structures.
Opportunities to Reduce Cost with
Manufacturing Technology
Due to the severe design-to-cost environment imposed on the
production of composite stnL.tures, it is essential that the major cost
drivers be identified early in the programs and their reduction addressed
B-23
from the outset. As examples of this type of· information, the cost
drivers for fiberglass honeycomb laminates and adhesive bonding are shown
in Figures B-S and B_6(S). It should be noted that these figures are
not quantitative as they only indicate the formats acceptable to designers.
The design of tools which circumvent the autoclave for curing
and bonding composite structures is an area which requires further
development.
the autoclave
For some complex structural configurations,
is becoming a major cost-driver because of energy require-
ments and, for example, new types of tools are being developed to fabricate
helicopter rotor-blades. An example of such tools is as follows:
• Integrally-heated, cooled-and pressurized tools
designed for both prototype and production
structures providing
reduced lead-time
cost reduction through labor savings
energy conservative concept
reduced possibility for extensive hardware
losses (as can occur in an autoclave)
increased rate of production due to more
rapid heating and cooling.
However, integrally-heated tooling requires a strong interface
between materials, process, tooling, and design. Extensive thermal
analysis is required to optimize the heat transfer efficiency of such
tools and innovative heating/cooling concepts need to be developed.
It is desirable to continue development of pultrusion machines
to produce "basic" shapes, e. g., sandwich closeout-members and Z-s tringers,
designed for greater part standardization throughout fuselage and other
subassemblies. Hand-fitting and subsequent high NDT cORts will, in this
way, be drastically reduced.
Another manufacturing method is to produce flat sheets with
complex fiber orientations using computer-aided filament-winding techniques
and produced on a large mandrel. The composite cylinder is then cut
longitudinally and laid flat. This method is in use at Messerschmitt-
"Bolkow-Blohm, GmbH.,.Ot tobn..m, Germany, for rotor-blade skins.
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A further cost saving opportunity for sand~ich structures
is to develop equipment to reduce the cost of machining complex configurations
in Nomex honeycomb cores. Lower cost glass-fiber reinforced plastic
honeycomb cores also need to be developed. Few developments have occurred
with honeycomb cores during the past 25 years. Cores need to be
developed which avoid or very much reduce the expensive and time-consuming
machining operations, but which at the same time do not compromise
strength, stiffness, and other properties.
Hand-finishing operations for composite structures need to
be reduced as they represent a significant part of the total component cost.
It has been found that composite structures in service on helicopters
sometimes require paint stripping which is also an expensive operation.
There is a need for programs centered on simplifying these procedures.
There is a need to develop design-oriented tape-laying machines
possibly with, for example, heating shoes to circumvent or reduce the
autoclave curing cycle by simultaneously providing curing of the tape.
Hm.,rever, it is also necessary to produce "dedicated" machines which may
be more limited in scope than the complex multifunctional equipment
currently available. Such equipment may not attempt to layup the entire
structure. Smaller machines should be designed to reduce or avoid
hand-layup in local areas which, for example, is frequently necessary
at wing-spar cap and root connections. This is an example of the require-
ment of a strong design/manufacturing methods interface which avoids
prejudices and cbnservative practices that occur in these disciplines.
This presents an opportunity to extend the boundaries of the disciPlines(8)
Potentially promising opportunities to reduce cost of composite
structures are by methods such as braiding developed by }lcDonnell-Douglas
Corporation, St. Louis, Missouri,
Weaving has been also applied for
to produce enclosed
(9)
flat structures
strue tures.
Further, structural
channel members have been braided in which rings and attachment fittings
have been integrally braided into the composite structure reducing
part-count, joining complexity and therefore cost. Computer-aided
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design and manufacturing methods (CADA}l) can be applied to these
processes and, furthermore, hybridized structures employing combinations
of fibers, for example, S-glass, Thorne1 T-300, and Kev1ar-49 can be
produced.
Conclusions and Recommendations
General
(1) The United States appears to be at least 4 years ahead
of European countries with advanced composite applications
to military fixed and variable sweep aircraft and to
civil aircraft structural developments. rlaintaining
this lead will provide U. S. companies with a
commanding position and valuable leverage in
negotiating agreements, air transport sales,
and subassembly production. The composite
capabilities and facilities acquired in the
United States will result in decisions being
made to produce such structures here in future
consortium agreements.
(2) The cost of flight-test and data reduction of civil
aircraft is high ($30,000/hour) and might reduce
the availability of funds for technological develop-
ments. Warranties represent a further financial
problem.
(3) Since 1943, problems of lack of automated fabrication
methods, limited service data and questionable cost
estimates have hindered the use of glass-reinforced
plastics in aircraft prima,'Y structures, with the
exception of the specialized rotor-blade.
(4) The experience with the advanced composite
horizontal stabilizers on the F-14', F-15, and F-16
aircraft will prove to be important for the
commercial airplane companies. The transfer of this
experience from military to civil structures using
analytical modeling is important. Spin-off from
military STOL structures technology to civil transport
design is expected.
Education and Retraining
(5) The problem of the aging design staffs will require the
training of new generations of designers. The current
NASA-sponsored program at Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute is a timely and important step.
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(6) Aerospace companies will need to retrain engineers
and designers in composite technologies well in advance
of eventual production commitments being made. Large
numbers of engineers are required throughout the
program.
On Design
(7) Strong materials/fabrication/design/NDE interfaces
must be developed in all programs. Excellent progress
has been made, but the interfaces need to be further
strengthened.
(8) Design for ease of llundestr'2ctive evaluation, maintenance
and repair are high priorit considerations to reduce
life-cycle costs.
(9) For some composite components, it may be necessary to
provide an alternative structure. When this can be
done, the composite component will be looked upon
more favorably should a technical or economic
problem occur.
Metallic Versus Composite Structures
(10) The design objectives of advanced metallic programs,
concurrently underway with composite programs,
suggest developmental trends with these competing
materials. If successful, the designers will have
a broad choice of structural possibilities. The
composite teams should be aware of these objectives,
examples of which are:
• 20-30 percent reduction in acquisition cost
• 15-20 percent reduction in maintenance cost
• Improved structural integrity at no increase in cost
• Extended performance through availability of new
metals technology.
(11) During the development of major composite structures
being compared with a baseline metallic counterpart,
it is imperative that the evolution of improved
definitions of design objectives be tracked. Design
goals change, e.g., thermal environments, yet
comparisons are most frequently made with those
goals defined at the outset of the program being
run to demonstrate a new technology.
B-29
(12) During the development of demonstration composite
structures being evaluated "ith a metallic counter-
part as the baseline, it is imperative that develop-
ments that continuously occur with metallic structures,
be closely follo"ed. It is advisable to determine,
firstly, whether or not significant improvements can
still be made "ith the baseline structure through the
use of alternative processing technologies or modi-
fications of the design configuration. As competitive
technologies appear, more attention will be devoted to
upgrading conventional technologies and improvements
can be expected.
Selective Reinforcement
(13) The application to civil transports of glass-reinforced
plastic laminates "spiked" or selectively reinforced
with graphite fibers is important. This use will
enable airlines to acquire experience, as soon as
possible, with this "new ll fiber.
Secondary Structures
(14) Secondary structures provide unique opportunities
to reduce weight and cost, using, for example, molded
graphite- einforced thermoplastic sheets, chopped
fibers, braiding, and weaving. Families
of components with a commonality of geometry can be developed.
Use of composites of these types and forms should
be further stimulated and high-volume commercial
fabrication methods closely followed. Metal
secondary components can be more expensive
items than primary parts. Composites will alleviate
corrosion problems which airlines sometimes experience
with secondary structures, particularly due to some
types of cargo.
Design to Lo"er Cost
(15) Composites should enable lead-times to be reduced
compared "ith that required, for example, for forging
dies. Designers should therefore find more time available
to conduct manufacturing cost/design trades.
(16) Programs need- to be directed to providing all the
information required by the preliminary designer to
facilitate his decisions and to stimulate innovative
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approaches. It is at this stage in the design process
that the leverage and '''vindOlv of opportunity" exists
in reducing cost, improving damage-tolerance, and
achieving other objectives.
(17) Efforts should be made to provide the designers
with relative and quantitative information on cost-
drivers at all stages of composite material develop-
ment so that reduction can be addressed.
(18) Cost information on all aspects of composite development
and use must be developed from the outset of programs
involving this material and presented in a format usable
by preliminary and detail designers. Such information
on metals enabling manufacturing cost/design trade-offs
to be conducted is being developed for the designers.
Composit' , will be competing with metals in the design-
to-lOlvest cost environment which will become increasingly
severe.
(19) When composites are applied on a substitution basis
for a product already in production, the learning curves
of composite and metallic structures may never intersect
as the metallic parts will be at an advanced point
on the learning curve. A more favorable position is
achieved when the designer has the confidence to apply
new materials at the preliminary design stage.
Cost Reduction Opportunities
(20) The development of new designs of tools and
processes is required to improve energy utilization
during the manufacturing operations. Energy utilized
by autoclaves is a cost-driver for structures of
cDmplex geometries where numbers of components cannot
be curved simultaneously. Examples of tooling
developments are:
fJ Integrally heated manifold tools
• Pultrusion equipment
• "Dedicated" design-oriented, limited scope) tape-
laying equipment
• Computer-aided winding equipment to produce flat sheets
• Braiding and weaving processes.
(21) To reduce cost. the development of alternative designs
of honeycomb cores and machining equipment for cores
are attractive opportunities.
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